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BEWARE OF GREENS IN PRAISE OF
THE COMMON LAW
James L. Huffinant
INTRODUCTION
After several decades of general agreement among environmental
law scholars and environmentalists that the common law is
inadequate to meet the challenges of environmental protection, a few
scholars have taken a second look at common law remedies in recent
years. Simple pragmatism explains some of this newborn interest in
the common law, while for others there has been at least some
acceptance of the efficiency arguments made by free market
environmentalists since the 1970s. But for the most part the fledgling
environmentalist case for revival of common law remedies is rooted
in a belief that a reinvigorated common law will further weaken
constitutional protections of property rights that might otherwise
stand in the way of command and control regulation.
Professor J.B. Ruhl has been a leading proponent of a resort to
common law-in particular, nuisance law as a protector of natural
capital and ecosystem services. While Ruhl understands and
appreciates the link between the common law and market allocation
of scarce resources, he makes his case as much on the prospect for
takings clause avoidance as on the considerable efficiency advantages
of markets. By this view the common law serves as a Trojan horse-a
gift to free marketeers and property rights supporters that is not what
it appears to be. This opportunistic embrace of the common law is
thought to be made possible by Justice Scalia's holding in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council that "background principles,"
including common law nuisance, exist as exemptions to takings
t Erskine Wood Sr. Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
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claims even where there is a total loss of economic value in a
regulated property.
Part I of this article is a brief tale of tree huggers, bean counters
and a tentative resuscitation of the common law among
environmentalists. Part II argues that reliance on public nuisance law,
a doctrine long since properly recognized as the police power by
another name, can serve only to promote judicial legislation or to
insulate the legislature from takings claims. While acknowledging
and commending the efficiency advantages of greater reliance on the
marketable rights of private nuisance law, Part III argues that the
recognition of private rights in ecosystem services will, in most cases,
result in a radical disruption of the settled expectations that the
common law exists to protect. Part IV argues there is more in Ruhl's
Trojan horse than meets the eye, namely the privileging of legislative
action taken in the name of the common. Part V responds to the stock
claim that policy driven reforms of the common law are only the
latest chapters in a long history of evolutionary change by
demonstrating that the common law has evolved for centuries in
response to bottom up consumer demand, not top down judicial
policy making. Part VI argues that American common law did
experience one radical change from its English roots with the
enactment of the federal and state constitutions. These constitutions,
particularly the 14 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, imposed
limitations on state governments that the courts are not privileged to
ignore. While agreeing that greater resort to the common law can
yield significant environmental benefits, this article concludes that
renewed interest in the common law fueled by Justice Scalia's
opinion in Lucas is driven largely by a desire to insulate
environmental regulation from the takings clause, while evidencing
very little appreciation for the common law as an institution for the
allocation of scarce resources.
I. PIGGY IN THE MIDDLE*
Environmental law, as a field of study and legal practice, arose
long after environmental problems entered the consciousness of
American leaders and policy makers. Indeed as early as 1876 the
United States government set aside a vast wilderness, in what would
become northwest Wyoming, to protect its unique natural qualities.
But even long before the creation of Yellowstone National Park,
A children's game in which a child in the middle attempts to capture a ball tossed back
and forth by children on each side. I am confident Professor Ruhl will not take offense. After
all, he describes himself as an environmental law weenie.
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ordinary folks in America and England were conscious of what we
now call environmental problems. They called them nuisances and
the common law provided a means of relief from, or compensation
for, such intrusions.
By the time laws relating to human impacts on the natural
environment came to be called environmental law in the 1970s, the
common law version had been largely abandoned in favor of
increasingly centralized regulation. Not only was common law
nuisance relegated to the dustbin as a means of dealing with
environmental problems, it was generally agreed not to be up to the
task in a modern, complex, technological world. Late 2 0 th century
environmental problems like air and water pollution, hazardous waste
and toxic substances, wildlife habitat and species preservation
required the expertise, resources and vast powers of the highest levels
of government. It was widely agreed that the piecemeal methods of
the common law could not make a dent in the pervasive
environmental problems facing the nation and the planet.1
But there was a small band of contrarians who argued that the
common law might still have some relevance to the solving of
environmental challenges. A few of these naysayers even claimed that
the common law might often be superior to the top down, command
and control, methods that quickly came to dominate environmental
law in the wake of the first Earth Day.2 Some of these folks called
themselves free market environmentalists.3 Others called them the
"lunatic fringe. 'A
By the 1990s the free market environmentalists had made
sufficient inroads that "market mechanisms" in the form of tradable
emissions permits and pollution taxes began to appear in some
environmental laws. By the end of the century "cap and trade" was a
generally accepted approach in proposals for regulating alleged
impacts on climate. But for most environmentalists nuisance law
remained the province of the lunatic fringe, at least until a few people
See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 121 (2004).
"The essential premise of much environmental law is ... that the physical characteristics of the
ecosystem generate spatial and temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of
natural resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common law tort rules."
2 See, e.g., THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners and Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2000).
3 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
4 Professor Lisa Heinzerling panel on "Bushian Environmentalism" at the annual meeting
of the Environmental Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools (January 5,
2004).
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took a look back at Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council5 and saw an opportunity.
The opportunity they saw did not reflect a realization that the
common law is, after all, a promising means for environmental
protection. Rather what they found buried in Scalia's Lucas opinion is
the opportunity to evade the nettlesome problem of the takings clause.
Justice Scalia held that a total loss of economic value resulting from
regulation constituted a categorical taking, unless background
principles of state property law would independently preclude the
uses now prohibited by regulation.6 Or to state the matter differently,
if state property law, including the common law of nuisance,
precluded all economic uses of particular properties, present day
regulations enforcing such limits will not constitute unconstitutional
takings of private property, notwithstanding the resulting total
diminution in economic value. The only hitch in this design for a
takings exemption might be the actual content of the common law.
Enter the reborn common law faithful, among them Professor J. B.
Ruhl who sees an opportunity to protect natural capital and ecosystem
services through reliance on nuisance law.7 Though a Johnny-come-
lately to the common law, Ruhl has never been a hard core, command
and control patriot. A self-declared member of the "radical middle,"
Ruhl once confessed to being among "the weenies of environmental
law.... " "When the extremes do not outright ignore us," wrote Ruhl,
"they portray us as gutless, spineless, passionless, malleable, and
shameless shills for the 'other side.' ' 8 The sides, between which Ruhl
claims the middle, are the "preservationist 'tree huggers' and the
"resourcist 'bean counters'. ' 9 But the middle Ruhl refers to when
claiming to be an environmental law weenie is not between common
law and command and control. It is between what has come to be
called anthropocentrism (bean counters) on the one hand and
biocentrism (tree huggers) on the other-that is Ruhl occupies the
5 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6 Justice Scalia held that "[a]ny limitation so severe [as to deprive land of all
economically beneficial use] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." Id. at 1029.
7 J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 756 (2009). See
also, J.B. Ruhl, Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 St. THOMAS L. REV. 1
(2005) and J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of "The Fragile Land System ",
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, (Fall 2005).
8 J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385,386 (2002).
9 Ruhl credits the terms "preservationist" and "resourcist" to J. Baird Callicot & Karen
Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conservation Concept, II CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
32, 34-5 (1997). He attributes "tree-huggers" and "bean-counters" to DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(1999).
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middle in terms of justifications for environmental protection. He has
not occupied the middle in terms of preferences among the array of
legal tools that might serve the goal of environmental protection.
It may seem odd to suggest that people would take sides on the
selection of legal tools, no matter how passionately they seek to
protect the environment. Why wouldn't environmental advocates be
pragmatic and opt for whatever approach is most effective in light of
their objectives? Certainly those seeking to promote economic
development have not hesitated to press for free markets, regulation,
subsidies, tax breaks, trade restraints or whatever works in pursuit of
their particular purposes. But not environmentalists; more often than
not they have stood on principle and that has meant both pleading
with and ordering people to do the right thing without regard for
cost. 10 That is why self-proclaimed free market environmentalists
have been viewed as wolves in sheep's clothing, and why Professor
Ruhl finds himself in the philosophical middle as a pragmatist willing
to argue that environmental protection is good for people.
To be fair, Ruhl has been a supporter of market approaches to
environmental protection, all of which rely on a combination of
command and control regulation and something resembling common
law property rights. He and Jim Salzman have written approvingly on
the dramatic growth of environmental trading markets," but not
without noting their limitations, particularly when it comes to the
provision and preservation of ecosystem services. 12 It is a concern for
ecosystem services that brings Ruhl to a consideration of the common
law. Although he attributes the abandonment of the common law in
favor of statutory regimes like the Endangered Species Act, in part, to
the perception that "nuisance doctrine was . . . a poor fit" in the
protection and management of species and ecosystems, he is
concerned that traditional command and control methods have not
been adequate to the task.'
3
It is not a coincidence that a relatively newfound concern for
ecosystem services coming at roughly the same time as Justice
10 The combination of preaching and commanding has a sort of Victorian ring to it. Good
people will see the light, but there will always be those in thrall to temptation or worse who will
require sterner measures.
"1 James Salzman & J.B. Ruh], Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607 (2002).
12 See id. at 612.
13 "These laws worked like a charm for a good while, until things got even more
complicated. We began to understand the breadth and depth of our impact on ecosystems and
the landscape, and to appreciate how puny the federal laws seemed in comparison to the
magnitude of large-scale ecological degradation." Ruhl, Toward a Common Law, supra note 7,
at2.
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Scalia's Lucas opinion has led a middle of the road pragmatist like
Professor Ruhl to the common law. While I have no doubt that Ruhl
is "interested primarily in advancing the broad integration of natural
capital and ecosystem service values into environmental decision
making," his pragmatism would not allow him to ignore the
possibilities presented by Lucas for "shrink[ing] the scope of
categorical takings."1 4 He is not the first to suggest that Scalia may
have unwittingly created a massive 5th Amendment exemption for
environmental regulation in a world of evolving property rights, 5 but
few others have turned their attention to analyzing how common law
doctrine might actually be used to sidestep the unrelenting
constitutional claims of private property owners.1 6  For most
14 Ruhl, supra note 7, at 760. See also, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, S.E. ENVTL. L. J. (forthcoming)
(arguing that the public trust doctrine can be grown from within to accommodate ecosystem
services and natural capital, a sort of backup approach for taking advantage of Scalia's alleged
exemption from the takings clause).
15 See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the
Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 856 (2000) (stating that "the Court may have inadvertently created
a golden opportunity for a return to a more neighborly society and a more ecologically sensitive
land use ethic, in which conflicts over the uses of private property disappear."); Samuel C.
Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles" or Principled Grab Bag?: The Constitutionalization of
Common Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 463, 523 (1998) (noting that "the Court's opinion makes clear
that common-law principles will be able to accommodate changing 'experiential propositions'
which would include, for example, new scientific understandings about the danger of a certain
practice."); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct 'Spin' on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411,
1427 (1993) (suggesting that the court effectively created a two tiered system of review in
takings cases with little likelihood that property owners will prevail "because environmental
protection laws almost never result in total economic deprivations,..."); Professor Joe Sax was
less optimistic about the implications of Lucas which he read as the Court's much belated
response to Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972), a Wisconsin case in which the
state court upheld the state's preservation of ecosystem values in the face of a takings claim.
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1440 (1993). See also J.B. Ruhl, The
"Background Principles" of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services-Did Lucas Open
Pandora's Box? (forthcoming).
16 Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 368 (2005). To the
extent these property doctrines are state law, it seems unlikely that Justice Scalia would be
either surprised or chagrined, although as a student of history he might raise one of those
impressive eyebrows at Blumm's and Ritchie's account of the public trust doctrine, for example.
To the extent these categorical defenses rely on federal law, Justice Scalia may yet have an
opportunity to opine. Michael Blumm and Lucas Ritchie, not fellow middle grounders with
Professor Ruhl, take an approach consistent with their position on the tree-hugger side of the
divide. Rather than focus on the prospects for environmental protection under an evolving
nuisance doctrine, they look to an assortment of property law doctrines which have served as
"categorical defenses" in takings cases. Blumm and Ritchie suggest that Justice Scalia, to his
"surprise and probable chagrin," laid the foundation for these categorical defenses by effectively
holding that in every takings case the preliminary question is whether the plaintiff has the
property right claimed to have been taken. Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 368 (2005). To the extent these property doctrines are state law, it
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environmental regulation these constitutional claims have been
persistent, but seldom successful, so there has been little demand for
translating theory to practice. In the context of Professor Ruhl's
interest in ecosystem services, however, there is a much higher
prospect of property owner success under a categorical taking rule.
Where ecosystem service protection requires that an entire property
remain undisturbed in its natural condition, a total loss of economic
value is a distinct possibility. A regulatory prohibition of
development will be a categorical taking under Lucas, but if nuisance
law (part of background principles) is found to preclude the
elimination of ecosystem services there will be no constitutional harm
to the property owner.
While the tree huggers may be unhappy with Professor Ruhl's
embrace of the idea that the ecosystem provides services to humans
and his advocacy of resort to the common law, many will be mollified
both by the reality that ecosystems might be preserved and by the
prospect of circumventing the takings clause. On the opposing side,
bean counters may object if property is taken without compensation,
but resort to the common law is generally thought to be a good thing
since it deals, for the most part, in private rights that serve, in turn, as
an essential ingredient of markets. Perhaps Professor Ruhl has found
a way to bridge the chasm between the two sides. As one who counts
himself a free market environmentalist, though my motives seem
always suspect to the tree huggers, I am in no position to judge
whether Ruhl's fascination with nuisance law will bring him closer to
those occupying the moral high ground of orthodox
environmentalism. The presumption of the failure of the common law
remains strong as does the disdain for the idea that individuals might
own natural processes and things, 7 so I fear Professor Ruhl will find
his bridge precarious on the green side of things.
On the other green (money) side of the environmental divide, there
is likely to be some enthusiasm for Ruhl's interest in the common law
of nuisance, particularly among those who think of themselves as free
market environmentalists. For free marketeers, an appeal of the
common law is that it deals largely in private rights that can be
seems unlikely that Justice Scalia would be either surprised or chagrined, although as a student
of history he might raise one of those impressive eyebrows at Blumm's and Ritchie's account of
the public trust doctrine, for example. To the extent these categorical defenses rely on federal
law, Justice Scalia may yet have an opportunity to opine.
17 J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239, 240 (1990). "The unifying
theme is a refusal to treat the natural world as a commodity subject to human domination.
Rather, a thoroughgoing green insists on respecting the moral autonomy of nature and seeks to
live in a manner that promotes ecological balance."
2008]
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bought and sold in transactions among willing buyers and sellers. It is
these voluntary exchanges that allocate resources to their highest
valued uses yielding the efficiency that equates with maximized net
social welfare. Social welfare, according to this way of thinking, is
nothing more than the aggregation of individual welfares, and
because it is impossible to know the relative preferences of others, 18 it
is only through voluntary, mutual exchange that we can be sure each
individual has maximized his or her personal welfare. Of course these
private rights can also be asserted in courts, but it is seldom necessary
to resort to litigation where courts understand that there role is to
confirm reasonable expectations and individuals are free to settle
disagreements in light of what the courts have done in other cases.
Markets depend upon the courts to both confirm and respect the
common law rules.
So even if part of Ruhl's motivation is to amplify background
principles of property law and thus take advantage of Scalia's
exemption from the categorical taking rule-not a market friendly
objective if reasonable expectations are destabilized, it is nonetheless
encouraging to free marketeers that the private rights of nuisance law
might be preferred to the blunderbuss of centralized, top down,
regulation. Ruhl's is not an argument from principle, unless one is
willing to view pragmatism as a principle. But most free marketeers
have embraced environmental trading markets, notwithstanding that
they abandon all reliance on markets to establish the efficient
allocation of scarce resources. 19 It is enough that environmental
trading markets provide incentives for more efficient achievement of
mandated allocations. So most free marketeers, like many who would
rather insist on environmental protection at any cost, are pragmatists
along with Professor Ruhl.2° We should therefore give his arguments
serious consideration despite his secondary objective of avoiding the
limits of the takings clause.
18 For the original statement of the "impossibility theorem" see Kenneth J. Arrow, A
Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. OF POL. ECON. 328 (1950).
19 Emissions trading and other market mechanisms in existing environmental regulations
do not rely on market transactions to determine the optimal level of pollution. Rather they are
dependent on the legislative or administrative setting of an allowable level of pollution. This
establishes the available supply and trading among those holding an interest in that supply is
expected to result in more efficiency (greater productivity) from the allowed pollution.
20 Ruhl also describes himself as an "instrumentalist," a term that might be understood to
allow for ad hoc, case-by-case, outcome oriented, decision making. Alternatively it might be
understood in the Hurstian sense as an explanation for the evolution of the law in a rule of law
system. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
[Vol. 58:3
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II. PUBLIC NUISANCE
Ruhl claims that common law nuisance will neatly accommodate
the protection of ecosystem services. Public nuisance, concludes
Ruhl, is a sort of no-brainer for his cause.21 Private nuisance also
holds promise, but it is more complicated-seven times more
complicated judging by the length of discussion Ruhl devotes to each
topic. Of course it is silly to correlate complexity with numbers of
pages, but it is a simple way of making the point that public nuisance
law, more than private nuisance, is the impenetrable jungle of which
22William Prosser wrote. There is not a lot to describe about jungles
that cannot be penetrated.
What can be said about public nuisance is that it has "nothing in
common [with private nuisance], except that each causes annoyance
or inconvenience to some one, 23 that it was once a catchall for low
grade criminal offenses that have for decades been largely subsumed
into various legislative prohibitions,24 and that any revival of the
concept in the courts is an invitation to judicial policy making. In the
latter sense it is a companion piece to other common law doctrines
dredged from the stagnant waters of often poorly understood English
common law-like the public trust doctrine,25 the natural use doctrine
21 Ruh], supra note 7, at 771. "Ecosystem service nuisances seem ready-made for public
nuisance under all these conditions."
22 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). The term
was employed decades earlier by Frank Rice in a context perhaps meant to include nuisance
law:
To the pedants of the dark ages, who were the exclusive custodians of the little
learning that then flickered in the world, it was a matter of mighty concern that the
administration of law should be confined within a narrow circle, and that a monopoly
of learning would diffuse itself among a coterie of ecclesiastics whose constant
struggle was to make that learning more difficult to obtain. In consequence we have
had transmitted to us a vast and intricate system founded upon innumerable
precedents and enactments, and interpreted by a horde of acute logicians, who
pursued every ramification of the subtlety to its earliest source, and literally thatched
every topic in the law with refinements and technique, until so late as the time of
Lord Mansfield it had become an impenetrable jungle to all but the elect.
FRANK S. RICE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AS EXPOUNDED BY OUR
COURTS OF LAST RESORT, STATE AND FEDERAL 56 (1896).
23 William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 411 (1942). Prosser
went on to conclude that "it is in the highest degree unfortunate that they [public and private
nuisance] are called by the same name."
24 "In [most] American states, public nuisance is now almost entirely a matter of special
statutes prohibiting particular things, and the question usually litigated is whether the case falls
within the statute." Id. at 412.
25 In fact Ruhl has written a companion piece with Jim Salzman arguing that the public
trust doctrine provides another opportunity to circumvent the takings clause in pursuit of
ecosystem service preservation. Ruhl and Salzman, supra note 14. For a revisionist history of
the public trust doctrine, see James L. Huffman, Speaking ofInconvenient Truths-A History of
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and custom. 26 It can also be said that the modem incarnation of public
nuisance is different from the historic concept in at least one
important way. Historically it provided a remedy for widely shared
annoyances and inconveniences, today it is meant to guard against the
violation of "public rights." What are these public rights, and where
do they come from?
The Restatement of Torts defines a public nuisance as "an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public., 27 This language might be understood to mean that all
members of the community have in common an individual right to be
free from certain annoyances and inconveniences, in the same sense
that tenants in common can have equal but distinct interests in the
same property. But in modem parlance the term is generally used to
mean that the public, as an entity separate and distinct from its
individual constituents, has rights. While the Restatement and the
historic common law tended to split the difference between these two
views by allowing that particular individuals might have parallel
actions in private nuisance,28 modem conceptions of public nuisance
do not assume that community rights are a mere proxy for private
rights. In the common law, however, the concept of public rights was
little evident in the law of public nuisance.
Speaking of the then fresher waters of English common law,
Blackstone wrote:
[N]usances are of two kinds; public or common nusances
which affect the public, and are an annoyance to all the
king's subjects; for which reason we must refer them to the
class of public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors: and
private nusances; which... may be defined, any thing done
to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or
hereditaments of another.29
the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FORUM 1 (2007).
26 All of these, including public nuisance and more, are among the "categorical defenses"
to takings claims identified by Blumm and Ritchie, supra note 16. Writing elsewhere, Ruhl
endorses the Blumm and Ritchie approach as yet another advantage of resort to common law.
"Indeed, there is no reason to stop at nuisance law in this regard, as a variety of common law
tort and property doctrines are aptly suited for evolution toward the new understanding of the
value of natural capital and the ecosystem services it produces." J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services
and the Common Law of the "Fragile Land System", 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 69
(2005).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B (1979).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 C (1979).
29 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 216 (Dawsons
of Pall Mall, 1966) (1769).
[Vol. 58:3
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Because public nuisances "annoy the whole community in general,
and not merely some particular person;" said Blackstone, they "are
indictable only, and not actionable., 30 Blackstone speaks of public
wrongs but not of public rights in his commentary on public nuisance.
Perhaps this merely reflects that Blackstone was writing at a time
when the concept of rights was less a dominant focus of civil society,
but he did devote an entire volume to the rights of persons and a
second volume to the rights of things. His rare use of the term "public
rights," in every instance save one, was in the context of discussions
of crimes and misdemeanors and in combination with the concept of
duties owed by individuals to the whole community.3'
Nowhere in these rare references did Blackstone attempt to define
or explain what he meant by public rights, and in that he was no
different than the American commentators who followed in his
footsteps. Kent never uses the term public rights but he did refer to
"rights of public necessity" 32 by which he clearly meant the "public
welfare ' 3 3 or the "general interests of the community. 34 Wood stated
that "[p]ublic nuisances . . .are such as result from the violation of
public rights, '35 but he offered no definition of public rights beyond
30 BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 167 (Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1966) (1769).
31 Wrongs also are divisible into, first, private wrongs ... ; and secondly, public wrongs,
which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole community, and are called
crimes and misdemeanors. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 118 (1765). And hence it appears how injurious, as well to private as public rights,
those statutes were, which vested in king Henry VIII, instead of the heirs of the founder, the
lands of the dissolved monasteries. Id. at 472.
WRONGS are divisible into two sorts or species; private wrongs, and public wrongs ...
the latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole
community, considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of
crimes and misdemeanors. 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 2 (1978).
[T]he king, in whom centers the majesty of the whole community, is supposed by the law
to be the person injured by every infraction of the public rights belonging to that community,
and is therefore in all cases the proper prosecutor for every public offence. 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1769). [W]rongs, or crime and
misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole
community, considered as a community, in it's social aggregate capacity. Id. at 5.It was
observed, in the beginning of this book, that crimes and misdemeanors are a breach and
violation of the public rights and duties, owing to the whole community, considered as a
community, in it's social aggregate capacity. Id. at 41.
The exception to this singular use of the term presumably carries the same meaning but
occurs in the context of an explanation of the relative powers of Parliament and the Crown: "Yet
where an act of parliament is expressly made for the preservation of public rights and the
suppression of public wrongs, and does not interfere with the established rights of the crown, it
is said to be binding as well upon the king as upon the subject." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 254 (1765).
32 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 338 (1832).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 340.
35 H.G. WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES 24 (2nd edition 1883). Absent a conceptual
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the requirement that there be injury not to particular persons but to
"all the king's subjects. 36 However, not just any injury will establish
either a public or private nuisance, said Wood, since if there is no
public or private right violated "it is 'damnum absque injuria."'37
With the exception of obstructions to public ways "over which all the
public have the equal right to pass,"38 Bishop left all of public
nuisance to his treatise on criminal law 39 and made no reference to
"public rights" as distinct from individual rights equally shared by all
members of the public. Hale wrote that public nuisances "result from
the violation of public rights," but offered no suggestion as to the
definition of those rights and, like Wood and Bishop, distinguished
public from private nuisance "upon the consideration of whether it be
indictable or not."40 Cooley defined a public nuisance as "one that
obstructs the public in the enjoyment of a common right or that
injuriously affects the community at large,.. .", In this statement we
might understand Cooley, like Bishop, to refer to individual rights
held in common, but Cooley cites to a Connecticut case holding that
"[t]he test is not the number of persons annoyed, but the possibility of
annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights. ' 42  The
Connecticut court offered no guidance for determining what these
public rights are.
Nor have other courts been particularly helpful in providing
abstract definition to the concept of public rights such that we might
better know what particular public rights exist. A large number of 19
th
century public nuisance cases arose in the context of obstructions to
definition of public rights, Wood catalogues particular examples drawn from various English
and American cases. As I will argue below, infra, Part V, these examples reflect the gradual
evolution of common law nuisance with changes on the margins to accommodate changing
social and physical circumstances.
36 Id. at 28.
31 Id. at 3.
38 JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW §948 (1889).
39 JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1858).
40 WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 436 (1896).
41 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 568 (1907).
42 Nolan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703, 706 (Conn. 1897). Ironically,
the defendant in the case was the City of New Britain which had been authorized by the state
legislature to undertake the action complained of. Because the plaintiff was not a resident of
New Britain and his property was not located within the boundaries of the city, the court held
that the legislative authorization (not to engage in what would otherwise be a nuisance, but to
acquire private property for a public improvement to be "paid for by that species of taxation
known as the 'assessment of damages and benefits') did not extend to plaintiff's property.
Although the plaintiff had sued for special damages resulting from a public nuisance, the case
might have been better considered a taking for a public use without just compensation. In any
event the Court made no effort to elaborate on its assertion that a public right was at stake in the
event of a public nuisance.
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navigable waters and public ways.4 3 Later in the century a growing
number of public nuisance cases involved the annoyances of industry
and of increasing contact between farm and city. In both of these
contexts the courts had Blackstone to rely upon, although to the
extent they chose to speak in terms of public rights they had little help
from that source. But more often than not there was no mention of the
idea of public rights. Rather the courts spoke of public good, public
welfare or public interest, without asserting that public fights were at
stake. Indeed most courts and commentators came to think of public
nuisance law as a mirror image of the state's police powers.
Nuisances could be enjoined by courts and regulated by legislatures
not because public rights were at stake but because the police power
is inherent in state sovereignty.
While 19 th and early 2 0 th century public nuisance cases made only
occasional references to public rights, modem advocates for an
expanded concept of public nuisance in the wake of Lucas rely
heavily on claims of public rights to justify their case. Professor Ruhl
relies on the Restatement in defining public nuisance as "an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public"
that (fortuitously) need not be a right in land.44 Mike Blumm and
Lucas Ritchie note that "in states that have adopted an expansive view
of public rights, the public trust doctrine can be effectively used as a
defense to takings claims in a variety of situations. 'AS Presumably
they contemplate that public nuisance claims will benefit from the
same 5th Amendment exemption. Allan Kanner and Mary Ziegler
suggest that public nuisance actions to enjoin natural resources
damages (of which the destruction of ecosystem services is
presumably one) are a vehicle for protecting public rights.46 In
contrast to tort law's concern for fault, writes Albert Lin, "[t]he focus
of nuisance law ... is on whether there is significant harm-that is,
significant interference with one's use and enjoyment of land or
significant impairment of public rights.' 4 Such claims of public right
are the basis of the recent lawsuit by eight states against several
energy companies claiming harm from global warming. In the words
43 See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); City of Hoboken v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 124 U.S. 656 (1888); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421
(1855); Irwin v. Dixion 50 U.S. 10, (1850); Willson v. Black Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245
(1829).
4 Ruhl, supra note 7, at 771.
45 Blumm & Lucas, supra note 16, at 343-4.
46 Allan Kanner & Mary E. Ziegler, Understanding and Protecting Natural Resources, 17
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 119, 128 (2006).
47 Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
897, 903-4 (2006).
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of plaintiffs' attorneys Matthew Pawa and Benjamin Krass, "[t]he
harms identified in the case are harms to clear public rights, such as
public safety (heat deaths, flooding), public health (heat stress,
increase in ground-level ozone smog), the integrity of natural
resources such as water supplies and forests, public property damage
via inundation of coastal land, and interference with navigation. ' 48
In his immediate post-Lucas commentary, Joe Sax twice quoted
with approval from Just v. Marinette County ("one of the cases that
launched the modem era of environmental law '49) to the effect that "it
is not an unreasonable exercise of police power to prevent harm to
public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural
uses."5 ° Although the Just court made reference to the police power
rather than nuisance,51 there remains little to distinguish public
nuisance from the police power, except that the courts will play a
central role in defining what public interests will be constituted as
public rights and, therefore, limitations on private rights. Eric
Freyfogle recognizes this advantage of public rights talk over public
interest talk in arguing that environmentalists should counter the
individual rights claims of property owners with claims of "the rights
of citizens generally to enjoy a healthy environment. 5 2 Carol Rose
has "been arguing for some time that we need a more robust language
of 'public rights' in the United States ... [to] bolster the sense that
public claims and decisions command respect along with private
ones." 53 Whether public rights claims are asserted in the context of
public nuisance, public trust, custom or any other of the litany of
"categorical defenses" identified by Blumm and Ritchie,54 the point is
that they can serve as a trump in 5 th Amendment takings claims. That
is not, says Ruhl, his primary objective, but it is nonetheless the
"Trojan horse" on which he will happily ride in quest of ecosystem
55
service protection.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the concept of public
rights, like the content of public nuisance law, is more than elusive of
48 Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance:
Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 449 (2005).
49 Sax, supra note 15, at 1438-39.
5o id. at 1439, quoting 201 N.W.2d at 768.
5' The Just court did rely on a public nuisance case, Hasslinger v. Hartland, 290 N.W. 647
(Wis. 1940); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769-70 (Wis. 1972). The court relied
much more heavily on public trust, an early indication that some modem courts would subsume
public trust and well as public nuisance into the police power.
52 Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 574, 589 (1999).
53 Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel,
18 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 25 (Supp. 2006).
54 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 16.
5 Ruhl, supra note 7, at 780.
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definition. Even Carol Rose, the most thoughtful and prolific writer
on the concept of public rights in natural resources, never offers an
abstract definition nor explains how any particular public right can be
known to exist.5 6 With Rose, as with Ruhl and the many others who
claim the existence of public rights, it is simply asserted that such
rights exist. Perhaps there is a persuasive case to be made for the
existence of public rights, but it has not been made in the context of
the environment and natural resources. Nevertheless, public nuisance
law as set forth in the Restatement and as described by those who
look to limit private rights free from constitutional obstacles, relies on
the concept of public rights. These public rights are assumed to exist
independent from the individual rights of members of the community
and, like individual rights, are meant to function as trumps in political
and legal process.57
If public rights claims are allowed to function as trumps in the
context of nuisance law, there is much theoretical work to be done on
the nature and sources of such rights. That is a discussion for another
time. For the purposes of this paper, we can at least understand public
rights claims to be assertions of a public interest in a particular
outcome. Rights, whether public or private, reflect some interest of
the rights holder and a corresponding obligation or duty on others that
is enforceable because of the existence of the right. 58 But a claim of
public interest does not necessarily imply the existence of a
corresponding public right.
If "public rights" is just another term for public interest, or a way
of identifying particularly important public interests, why should the
courts have any role in determining what those public interests are?
As evidenced by the wide array of often conflicting claims to
represent the public interest emanating from a multitude of self-
described public interest groups, the community interest is by no
56 In her now classic Comedy of the Commons article, Rose mentions public rights in
excess of twenty times without definition beyond asserting that such rights are inherent and
include navigation, fishing, hunting (maybe) and use of roads, waterways and the seashore.
Carol Rose. The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986). Elsewhere Rose argues that "public rights" language was more
widely in use in the 19'h century, a claim not reflected in the treatises. However, assuming she is
correct that "public rights" talk became less frequent in the 20"' century, it does not appear to
reflect a loss of understanding of the concept of public rights since there seems never to have
been an abstract explanation for the content or source of those rights beyond the existence of
some perceived public interest. "The subtext behind the eclipse of public-rights discourse," says
Rose, "is that the public does not matter." Rose, supra note 53, at 25. But a subtext behind the
revival of public rights discourse is not only that the public matters, but that it has a trump even
over constitutionally guaranteed private rights.
57 For a discussion of the concept of rights as trumps, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
58 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85 (1961).
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means self evident. It is therefore not surprising that, in the
democratic states sharing the common law tradition, the annoyances
and inconveniences of historic public nuisance law have for a century
or more been largely the concern of legislative regulationf 9 Surely
the legislature, even with its many failings, is a better source for the
community interest than is a single, often unelected, judge. What
then, other than the prospect of trumping the takings clause, is the
case for relying on public nuisance to do what can already be done in
the name of the police power? Notwithstanding the Restatement and
the encouragement of Professor Ruhl and others, the courts would do
best to leave regulation of public nuisances to legislatures, but not, as
60Carol Rose urges, in the name of the common law. Leaving the
regulation of public nuisances to the police power and the legislature
would be a bit of common law evolution consistent with the
constitutional separation of powers and reflective of what most courts
have done for more than a century, though it would remove such
regulations from the convenient cover of "background principles."
Professor Ruhl suggests that an advantage of common law
nuisance is its capacity to reflect local circumstances and values. 61 As
compared to our modern reliance on federal and even state command
and control regulation, he is surely correct. But as compared to the
diverse array of local, representative, legislative bodies that set
standards for civil life in American communities, there is little to
favor a court's intervention over legislative determination of the
public interest. As I will demonstrate below, it is one thing for
common law judges to formulate as rules their understanding of
existing community customs and expectations. It is quite something
else for modem judges to change those rules in the name of serving
the public interest as perceived by the judge or by particular litigants.
59 In their famous 1890 article on a common law right of privacy, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis argued that "the protection of society [by common law courts] must come
mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual." Noting that "[i]t would doubtless
be desirable that the privacy of the individual should receive the added protection of the
criminal law [to which category public nuisance belongs], but for this, legislation would be
required." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
219-220 (1890).
60 "For almost a century now, legislators-with judicial acquiescence-have taken over
the task of refining and specifying the range of acceptable landowner practices, once defined
only by judicially administered trespass and nuisance law on a case-by-case basis." Carol M.
Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings
Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 281 (1996). As I argue infra, Part V, what Rose
disparages as the case-by-case approach of the courts is the very thing that gives the common
law its legitimacy. Case-by-case is the method of the common law, while the legislative is an
entirely different. Just calling legislation the common law does not make it so in any meaningful
sense.
61 Ruhl, draft supra note 7, at 774.
[Vol. 58:3
BEWARE OF GREENS
While it is true that public nuisance law generally requires a
balancing of interests, leaving significant discretion where cases are
tried to juries, and it is true that juries drawn from the general public
have a certain democratic quality, it is also the case that judges will
finally decide what counts as a public interest (public right?) worthy
of consideration in the balance. Most judges will have opinions about
the relative importance of competing claims on the public interest, but
they have no legitimate claim nor institutional competence to resolve
that competition. That is what legislatures do. Judges have particular
expertise on the subject of rights except where, as with public
nuisance, rights are made to depend on changing determinations of
the public interest. No doubt this is why particular interests prefer to
describe their policy objectives as public rights, and why public
nuisance is a particularly slippery slope in the background of a
property rights system.
The judicial role in public nuisance law is thus ambivalent in
separation of powers terms. Historically judges have declared,
without anything resembling legislative input, that certain actions or
inactions constitute a public nuisance. Or judges might instruct juries
that if certain conditions are satisfied a public nuisance can be found
to exist. The difficulty is that once it is established that many people
share in an alleged injury, any injury can offend a public right or be
damnum absque injuria at the discretion of the judge. Because the
existence of the requisite public right depends on the existence of a
qualifying public interest, the exercise of that judicial discretion
requires a balancing of affected interests or a weighing of the
importance of the asserted public interest. The judge has nothing to
offer on this subject except a personal opinion or the opinions of
particular litigants. Alternatively the judge might be asked to
determine whether or not a legislatively declared public nuisance
satisfies the common law requirements. Most judges will be properly
hesitant to second guess the legislature on what constitutes the public
interest, but those who do will have only their own opinion to offer in
support of a different outcome. It is therefore not surprising that, for
the most part, public nuisance law has been subsumed, like criminal
law, into the police powers of the legislative branch of government.
In a constitutional regime where the police powers of the states
know no limits except those explicit or implied in the federal and
state constitutions, there can be little doubt that legislatures have
authority under the police power to regulate for the purpose of
protecting ecosystem services. In light of this reality of state
legislative power, we might ask what is to be gained by embracing
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Professor Ruhl's suggestion that public nuisance law be revived in
service to ecosystem service protection. Two possibilities come to
mind. On the one hand we might appeal to direct judicial expansion
of public nuisance law because we have been unsuccessful in
persuading the legislature to do it. On the other hand we might appeal
to legislative regulation in the name of public nuisance law in
anticipation that, if such regulation destroys all economic value in
private property, no 5th Amendment compensation will be due in light
of Lucas's background principles exemption. While both of these
possibilities reflect Ruhl's call for pragmatic intrumentalism, neither
evidence much respect for the constitutional principles of separation
of powers or individual liberty.
III. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Professor Ruhl's case for protecting ecosystem services under
private nuisance law will have more instinctive appeal to free
marketeers because of its reliance on private rights. For that same
reason it presumably will have less appeal to orthodox
environmentalists. The latter will object that ecosystem services
cannot be owned by private parties and that it offends moral principle
and the sanctity of nature to suggest that individuals might have the
right to decide whether or not to compromise or sacrifice the natural
ecosystem. If that is a correct summary of the position of at least
some environmentalists, there is little to be said to them in defense of
Ruhl's ideas beyond an appeal to pragmatism. I will thus turn my
attention to the prospects for market provision of ecosystem services
in a property regime that includes common law nuisance and leave
the pragmatism argument to Professor Ruhl, since he has a better,
though still limited, chance of influencing green think.
Markets cannot function without private rights (including the
proprietary interests of government) that can be bargained for and
exchanged. In the case of private nuisance law such exchanges will
not conform to the archetypal buying and selling of goods and
services, but are nonetheless market transactions resulting in scarce
resources being allocated to their most valued uses. A transaction
based on private nuisance law might involve A paying B for the right
to impose a cost (harm) on B that would otherwise constitute a
nuisance. A would thus acquire something in the nature of an
easement or servitude allowing A to interfere with B's use and
enjoyment of B's property. Robert Goldstein argues that recognizing
A's right to fill wetlands with resultant costs to B would evidence "a
fundamental misstatement of ecological reality as well as a slanted
[Vol. 58:3
BEWARE OF GREENS
view of property. 62 What the assignment of property rights has to do
with ecological reality is not apparent, but it is clear that the right to
preservation (or destruction) of wetlands or other natural capital could
be and has been, at one time or another, assigned to either interested
party. As Professor Coase pointed out many years ago, assuming zero
transactions costs it will not matter to ultimate resource use how these
rights are assigned in the first place.63 But it is clear that Professor
Ruhl imagines the right to ecosystem services belonging first to the
property owner benefitting from those services and not to the property
owner from whose property the services arise.64 So I will proceed, for
the moment, with that assumption.
As Ruhl explains, a private nuisance exists where one person's
action (including failure to act in some cases) results in unreasonable
harm to another person's use and enjoyment of his or her land.
Relying on the Restatement, Ruhl sets forth the four basic
considerations in establishing a private nuisance: 1) an intentional
invasion of plaintiff's property, 2) interfering with the use and
enjoyment of that property, where 3) the gravity of the harm to the
plaintiff exceeds 4) the utility of the conduct to the defendant. 65 The
latter two factors go to the elusive question of reasonableness, which
turns not just on an accounting of harm and benefit but also on social
costs and benefits and the reasonable expectations of both parties in
light of local circumstances. Ruhl concludes that all of these factors
62 Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics
and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 381 (1998). Goldstein's
comment is in response to Richard Epstein's assertion that mandated wetland preservation may
provide "a possible gain to the public; [but] it does not eliminate the constitutional obligation [to
compensate]." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 123 (1985). Although the initial assignment of property rights does make a
distributional difference and can make an allocational difference given the reality of transactions
costs, there is no explanation for Goldstein's position other than a moral claim that some or all
ecological values cannot be owned.
63 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1960).
'A As the Coase theorem implies, there is no way to know in the abstract whether A is
interfering with B's property use or visa versa. It is the law that makes that determination, but
the general principle underlying nuisance law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your
own so as not to injure another's), does not resolve the matter. It is only resolved by particular
decisions on particular facts. It is the accumulation of such decisions over time that allows the
common law judge to articulate a general rule of liability. Albert Lin finds "less convincing...
Coase's equating the prevention of a harm with the conferring of a benefit." In Coase's example
of a rancher's cows damaging a farmer's crops, Lin says most people would say the cows
harmed the crops and not visa versa. "Hann... is not purely subjective. Rather, what qualifies
as harm rests largely on societal norms about acceptable behavior." Lin, supra note 47, at 932.
Coase would not disagree. His point is that it could be the other way around. Indeed it was the
other way around in western American states with fencing-out laws reflecting the then existing
societal norms favoring livestock grazing over farming. The common law, properly conceived
and implemented, will be a reflection of those society norms evidenced by ordinary practice in
the community.
65 Ruhl, supra note 7, at 765-772.
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can be applied to conflicts over ecosystem services and that often, but
not always, actions destructive of ecosystem services could be found
to be nuisances.
One might quibble with Ruhl's conclusions on each of these
points. For example, where property B has benefitted from storm
surge protection provided by the shifting dunes on property A's
beachfront, what is the "invasion" of B's property when A develops
the beachfront and destroys the dunes? Presumably storm water does
invade B's property in quantities not previously experienced, so
assuming it can be demonstrated that A's destruction of the
beachfront dunes is the cause, the invasion requirement is met. But
where is the invasion when A destroys forest habitat and B's orchard
suffers from reduced pollination as a result (again assuming cause can
be proven). The problem is not that something harmful has invaded
B's property, rather the problem is that something beneficial has
failed to invade. But, says Ruhl, the Restatement only requires that
the plaintiff be made worse off by the defendant's actions.66 Thus
invasion does not mean the physical presence of something harmful,
or even physical harm resulting from invisible but measurable forces
put in motion by defendant. It means only that the plaintiff is worse
off in the use and enjoyment of land as a result of defendant's
actions-whether due to the imposition of harm or the withdrawal of
benefit. Of course it cannot be quite that simple. If the closing of A's
motel results in a loss of business at B's adjacent caf6, is A liable in
nuisance for making B worse off? Surely not, though it is the
withdrawal of a benefit. Perhaps the difference is that storm surge
protection can be said to be a "natural" benefit while cafd business is
merely business. But what if the pollinating bees in the example
above are drawn to an alfalfa field rather than a native forest and the
alfalfa field is plowed under to make room for a shopping center. Are
those pollination services natural or merely business?
These questions and thousands more await lawyers if Professor
Ruhl persuades legislatures and courts to embrace an expanded
doctrine of private nuisance. If the harm-benefit distinction has been
abandoned, as Justice Scalia's suggests in Lucas,67 perhaps a natural-
nonnatural distinction, for which there is some precedent, can be
made to give nuisance law some definition while accommodating the
protection of ecosystem services. But even then property owners will
face the uncertainties inherent in the balancing of interests called for
by the Restatement. Whether these uncertainties are easily
66 Id. at 12.
67 505 U.S. at 1023-1024.
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accommodated in the day-to-day risk assessment required of
economic actors, or prove debilitating to investment and productivity
depends on what the courts do in individual cases and how they view
the role of the common law in modem American jurisprudence.
Could we avoid yet another discussion of the role of the courts and
of the common law in an age of constitutions, legislation and
regulation simply by concluding that Ruhl's proposal is a nonstarter
because the idea of private rights in ecosystem services is
unworkable? The idea may be unacceptable to many on the tree-
hugger side, but it is certainly not unworkable. The central point of
ecological economics is that so-called ecological services do have
measurable economic values.68 Those values may not have been
accounted for in the past for three fundamental reasons. First, we have
only just begun to understand the connection between the natural
ecology and many benefits we derive from it, but have taken for
granted. No doubt we have much more to learn, and some of what we
think we now know will prove not to be so. Second, what we value
changes over time for a multitude of reasons. Thus, in the past we
may have taken little interest in things we today view as important
ecological services. Third, even where we understood that things we
value are provided by the natural ecology, we may have lacked the
institutional arrangements necessary to allow our values to be
expressed in the political and economic competition for scarce
resources.
Although these three factors are interrelated,69 Professor Ruhl's
exploration of the common law speaks largely to the third. He does
not suggest that we abandon the highly centralized command and
control approach of the Endangered Species Act, but he does
recognize its failings and suggests that we also look to the highly
decentralized, private transactions of common law nuisance. While
some may see this approach as another opportunity to sue people who
68 See generally ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF
SUSTAINABILITY (Robert Costanza ed., 1991); HERMAN E. DALY AND JOSHUA FARLEY,
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (2003).
69 We might value ecological preservation because we like experiencing nature or just
knowing it is undisturbed by human presence. Many of those who advocate for ecological
preservation and object to Professor Ruhl's middle of the road pragmatism will claim to speak
for the ecology itself and to have risen above mere human preferences. But there is no escaping
that what humans advocate for is what they prefer, and what particular humans prefer is
inevitably a reflection of what they understand to be the burdens and benefits of the alternatives.
Preferences will influence what we seek to understand and what we think we understand will
influence our preferences. But this interaction between preferences and knowledge does not take
place in a vacuum. It happens in the context of social institutions that exist, in part, to resolve
competing preferences in a world of scarce resources and to advance what we know about those
resources and the effects of their use or non use.
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are behaving badly (and therefore like the idea), the reality is that
recognition of ecosystem service destruction as a private nuisance
would have its largest impact in the context of market transactions.
There would certainly be some lawsuits to establish or confirm that
ecosystem service destruction is a nuisance (or to find that legislative
declarations to that effect are not a taking of private property), but
such judicial rulings would quickly serve to redefine property
boundaries and thus the relative positions of market participants in
future market transactions.
Putting aside the transitional implications of such an innovation in
common law nuisance,70 there is no reason to conclude that rights in
ecosystem services cannot be the object of market transactions just
like the many other sticks in the proverbial bundle constituting
property rights. Indeed the theory of free market environmentalism
argues that internalizing these values to market transactions will
improve prospects for achieving the truly efficient outcome, an
outcome that may well be more protective of natural ecosystems than
the political allocation of those resources achieved under the
Endangered Species Act and other command and control or public
management regimes.
Consider the following variation on the earlier example in which A
owns beachfront property on which sand dunes providing storm surge
protection to B's property are located. As noted above,71 the Coase
Theorem teaches that, assuming zero transactions costs and no
constraints on permissible exchanges, the future of the sand dunes
will be the same whether A has a right to destroy them or B has a
right to the storm surge protection they provide. If A has the right to
destroy the dunes, B will acquire that right and choose not to exercise
it if storm surge protection is worth more to B than destruction of the
dunes is worth to A. Alternatively, if B has a right to storm surge
protection, A will not acquire that right and thus a right to destroy the
dunes if the value to A of dune destruction is less than the value to B
of storm surge protection. Thus, given the assumption that storm
surge protection is worth more to B than dune destruction is worth to
A, the dunes will be preserved in either case. By definition this is the
efficient result, at least at that moment in time.72
70 See discussion infra at note 159.
71 Supra note 63 and accompanying text.
72 An advantage of these private arrangements, according to welfare economics theory, is
that we are not wedded to this particular allocation of resources for the indefinite future as we
often are (due to political inertia) when an allocation is made by legislative or administrative
action. If in the future, the value of dune destruction to A comes to be worth more than the value
of storm surge protection to B, the parties will agree to an exchange of rights, thus assuring that
the resource will continue to be allocated to its highest valued use. Of course it is this prospect
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Of course there are transactions costs and they do influence the
allocation of scarce resources. In the foregoing example, if the only
property owner affected by A's proposed destruction of beachfront
sand dunes is B, transaction costs will likely be small and therefore
not an obstacle to agreement. But in all probability, A's sand dunes
will provide storm surge protection to multiple properties resulting in
higher transactions costs, but also resulting in greater aggregate value
on the side of storm surge protection. It is possible, maybe even
likely, that in situations like this the high transactions costs inherent
in negotiating on behalf of multiple parties will prevent an exchange
even when the aggregate value to the many of storm surge protection
exceeds the value to A of destroying the dunes. So, taking
transactions costs into account, it turns out that the initial assignment
of right as between A and B does matter to the allocation of the
resource. We do not necessarily get the efficient outcome, assuming
the transactions costs of alternative allocative institutions do not
exceed the value of the exchange.73 It is for this reason that Richard
Posner suggests in Economic Analysis of Law that property rights and
liabilities should be assigned in the first instance to the party that
would acquire them had they been initially assigned to other party.74
However, we cannot always know who will value a right or
liability more highly and, in any event, those valuations can be
expected to change over time. Thus Posner's suggestion will not
always get the assignment right in the first instance and even where it
does it is not likely to remain the efficient allocation of rights as time
passes and circumstances change. It is the reality that transactions
costs and therefore initial assignments of right do make a difference.
that will lead most tree huggers to object to reliance on private nuisance law, even if the initial
outcome is the one they favor. While many tree huggers insist that environmental and ecological
protection must be undertaken at any cost, human experience demonstrates that tradeoffs are the
essence of existence in a world of scarce resources. See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OF
PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974).
73 The transactions costs of non-market allocations of resources are generally ignored in
analyses of regulatory alternatives to markets, even though the primary justification of
intervention is the need to internalize costs. The reality is that these unaccounted for political
transactions costs are often very high. In the context of ecosystem services, the transactions
costs of command and control regulation can be particularly high due to "multiple and
interconnected threats, greater scientific uncertainties, irreversible losses, and intergenerational
tradeoffs . . . [but] [o]nce one recognizes that societal resources should not be wasted in
pursuing environmental goals any more than in pursuing any other societal good, such
complexities are merely an undeniable reality. Tailored commands do not overcome the
complexities, but in most instances just quietly ignore [them]." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People
or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127,
1184 (1999).
74 RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36 (2d ed. 1977).
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That has led many mainstream environmentalists to embrace
economic theory, perhaps ironically, at least to the extent that it
provides a market failure explanation for command and control
regulation-to wit, where high transactions costs prevent exchanges
that would allocate resources to higher valued uses, government
should command a reallocation and thus assure an efficient result.
There are many potential flaws in this market failure justification for
regulation, but if one is willing to claim that governmental command
and control can produce efficiency where markets fail, one has
embraced both the goal of efficiency and markets where they do not
fail. If a market in ecosystem services can result from an accounting
for ecosystem services in private nuisance law, then all but the most
principled tree huggers should be willing to give the idea serious
consideration.
We thus come full circle to the tree hugger-bean counter divide.
Tree huggers want no part of any economic justification for
environmental protection. Efficiency has to do with getting from
nature the most net benefit to humans. Tree huggers believe the
environment warrants protection for its own sake. Bean counters, on
the other hand, seek to maximize net social benefits from both
protection and exploitation of the environment. When markets work
they are the preferred option because they provide the most accurate
accounting of harms and benefits, but where markets fail most bean
counters are willing to turn to government for a cost/benefit analysis.
In proposing a resort to private nuisance law in the allocation of
ecosystem services, Professor Ruhl drifts precariously in the direction
of the bean counters, but closet pragmatists among the tree huggers
may be open-minded if the likely results look promising.
IV. WHAT'S INSIDE RUHL'S TROJAN HORSE?
Professor Ruhl confesses that evasion of the takings clause fuels at
least some of his interest in the law of nuisance. More about that
below, but first a suggestion as to another agenda concealed in the
Trojan horse. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is
nothing preventing B, whose property benefits from storm surge
protection, from bargaining with A to acquire something in the nature
of an easement or servitude in the preservation of A's sand dunes.
Assuming no constraining legislation or regulation, this could be
accomplished without any change in the law as it presently exists in
most jurisdictions. But, of course, that is not what Professor Ruhl has
in mind. Rather he has in mind that a court or a legislature will
declare that the destruction of sand dunes or other natural features that
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provide ecosystem services to other properties is a common law
nuisance. The context of such a declaration will not be a situation in
which there are no existing rights relative to ecosystem services and a
court or legislature is called upon to make an initial assignment.
Rather the context will be the common law which has existed for time
out of mind, and the rights declared will be understood as rights that
have always been thus. This context is essential to achieving the
takings evasion objective. The declaration of a right in the beneficiary
of ecosystem services, rather than in individuals who would alter the
natural environment, makes ecosystem preservation the default
position, thus appealing to pragmatic tree huggers while assuring that
the costs of reallocation will be borne by those seeking to develop
land and resources.
If rights in ecosystem services were being assigned in the first
instance, we might have resort to Posner's guideline and assign them
to the parties most likely to purchase them from others if assigned to
those others in the first place, and that today might well be those
benefitting from ecosystem services. But we are not starting from
scratch in the assignment of such rights. There are long standing
practices with corresponding expectations that are more than wishful
thinking on the part of affected property owners.75 In some cases
expectations have been confirmed in one way or another as legally
enforceable rights. But even practices and expectations that have not
been so confirmed cannot be easily dismissed as unimportant. Indeed
the very essence of the common law, at least as it emerged and
evolved over several centuries of Anglo-American experience, is its
acceptance and confirmation of established practices and customs.
What Professor Ruhl proposes is a radical break with accepted
practice and custom-effectively a reassignment of property rights at
the behest of the courts or the legislature. Some will say this is a
taking of private property in contravention of the 5 th Amendment.
Others will say it is just part of the evolution of the common law that
should be part of the expectations of every property owner.
Professor Ruhl is clearly in the latter camp, having acknowledged
that an advantage of nuisance law is its status as background principle
under the Lucas decision, but he would probably claim there is
75 Based on extensive research among poor communities in Peru, Haiti and the
Philippines, Hernando de Soto concluded that, in establishing property rights to benefit the poor
through the forces of capitalism, it is critical to understand that judges and legislators are not
writing on a tabula rasa. Customs and traditions of possession, as well as vested legal rights, are
deeply rooted and must be respected if we expect to succeed and to avoid significant social
disruption. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE, 165-75 (2000).
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nothing radical about his proposal. Once we get past the "elements"
of a nuisance action, which exist, some would say, only to make the
jungle impenetrable, nuisance law comes down to balancing. Every
case is, therefore, an ad hoc weighing of the relevant interests based
upon what is known at the time. Ruhl's argument is that we know a
whole lot more about ecosystem services than we did even a decade
ago. Most judges probably had never heard of the concept of
ecosystem services a decade ago. Indeed many judges likely remain
ignorant today. A decade or two ago the average judge or jury would
have easily concluded that A's destruction of beachfront sand dunes
caused no harm to B or to the broader society, so in balancing harm to
B and to society against the utility of A's beachfront development a
ruling in favor of A was never in doubt. But when judges (and juries)
are made aware of ecosystem service losses caused by A, the balance
may well shift sufficiently to constitute dune destruction a nuisance.
What is the surprise-how are expectations changed-when new
knowledge intervenes to shift the balance?
It is perfectly conceivable that a society might have a property
regime that operates on the following basic premise: individual rights
in the use and occupation of land and other resources are absolute,
subject only to the unlimited discretion of the state to reassign those
rights in the public interest. That is the sort of property regime that
has existed in some legal systems and has even been constitutionally
guaranteed. But it is not a property regime that will have positive
results in terms of economic development or social prosperity, nor is
it consistent with Anglo-American tradition or the American
constitutional principles of limited government and individual
rights.76
Perhaps I overstate the pliability Ruhl contemplates for America
nuisance law, but I do not believe I misrepresent its implications for
individual property owners or for the society that has prospered on the
shoulders of individual initiative and creativity. The point is not that
A must be allowed to destroy the beachfront dunes without regard for
private or public harm. Rather the point is that radical changes in the
law resulting in uncompensated reassignments of property rights will
generally not be the best or fairest way to account for and
accommodate a new understanding of the costs and benefits of
beachfront development. Property owner B could acquire A's
property, or an easement in A's property, to preserve the dunes. If the
76 "There is something intrinsically suspicious about any theory of constitutional rights
that can be evaded merely through government edict." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial
Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1529 (1990).
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value of storm surge protection to B is not sufficient to meet A's
price, or if B simply cannot afford to pay the price, B can collaborate
with other affected parties to acquire an interest in the dunes. The
state could offer to purchase a right in the dunes, or use its expansive
eminent domain powers to condemn such a right." In other words,
the objective of ecosystem service protection could be achieved by
means other than Professor Ruhl's alternative to command and
control regulation. It is all a matter of who pays.
If there is no dispute that preservation of ecosystem services will at
least some times be a good thing and the only question is who pays,
most tree huggers will be incredulous at my suggestion that those
benefitting from ecosystem services foot the bill for their protection.78
These benefits arise naturally from the environment. They are in the
nature of things. One might even say they are natural rights. The very
suggestion that individuals have a right to alter the natural
environment, or that other people might have to purchase a right to
preserve nature, are not worthy of consideration. But it is precisely
such natural rights arguments that once justified environment altering
property development in the face of nuisance challenges. The default
rule for most of American and English history has favored resource
development, 79 often in the name of natural use of land and resources.
Perhaps it is time for that default rule to change, indeed much modem
environmental regulation has affected such a change with respect to
particular resources and uses of those resources. But in a rule of law
system, change does not come willy nilly or on the command of
whomever happens to hold power. Legal change, particularly changes
that affect vested rights, must come in accordance with established
process and in compliance with the values underlying that process.
From this perspective, the crux of the question raised by Professor
Ruhl's proposal for expanded reliance on common law nuisance to
protect ecosystem services is whether it would be just another logical
77 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
78 Jim Salzman reports that in presenting his paper advocating the creation of markets in
ecosystem services to various academic workshops, "environmentalists were disturbed and, in a
few cases, outraged by paying farmers to put in fencing [to protect riparian habitat]." James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 954 (2005). Peter Byrne writes that "greens reject the political economy function of
compensation because ecological balance is a good independent of whether it is preferred by the
majority ... " Byrne, supra note 17, at 249.
79 "An altered common law regime helped fuel the transformation of the natural landscape
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the vast savannahs fell first to the
pioneer's plow, then to McCormick's reaper, and finally, in the twentieth century, to bulldozers
planting the last row crop, houses." Babcock, supra note 15 at 878-79. On the common law's
antipathy to wilderness see also John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American
Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1996).
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step in the long history of common law evolution or an unjustifiable
break with the reasonable expectations created by the common law
itself. Has Ruhl concealed in his Trojan horse a proposal for a vast
reassignment of property rights? Or would following his lead be an
act of fidelity to the great traditions of the common law?
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW
While I am sympathetic with Professor Ruhl's interest in private
nuisance, it should be apparent that I am skeptical of its application to
ecosystem services and natural capital. I am even more skeptical of
his proposals with respect to public nuisance. In defense of both, Ruhl
identifies the many advantages to efficient resource allocation and
wise management that come with local decision making. Because
public nuisance really equates with the police power, any advantage
of decentralization will come only from the prospect that local
governments will have a role in defining nuisance. This is not an
insignificant advantage, but it comes at the cost of insulating from a
takings challenge any regulation undertaken in the name of nuisance
prevention. While private nuisance provides the same insulation from
the takings clause, at least as many have interpreted Scalia's opinion
in Lucas, it brings decision making to its most decentralized level.
Nothing is more local than market transactions between willing
buyers and sellers. 80 So three cheers for the common law and maybe
two cheers for Ruhl. There is too much inside the Trojan horse to
allow for a third cheer for the good Professor.
As suggested above,81 a common response to takings claims in the
context of property rights adjustments that can be said to be rooted in
the common law is that such changes are merely the latest adaptations
in a centuries long evolutionary process. Although Ruhl has said
elsewhere that "[ilt is too easy to propose that the common law
simply reverse direction and place a 'green thumb on the scales of
justice' in favor of protecting ecosystems in general, 82 he does argue
that "common law tort and property doctrines are aptly suited for
evolution toward the new understanding of the value of natural capital
and the ecosystem services it provides." 83 Reference has already been
made to Blumm and Ritchie who urge a broad range of categorical
exemptions from takings liability on the basis of "[t]he evolution of
80 See James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through
Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004).
s Text accompanying note 26, supra.
82 Ruhl, supra note 26, at 8 (quoting Sprankling, supra note 79, at 588).
93 Ruhl, supra note 15, at 19.
[Vol. 58:3
2008] BEWARE OF GREENS
background principles . . . . "84 Robert Goldstein argues that the
"evolutionary nature" of the common law allows for the addition of
"green wood in the bundle of sticks" that constitute common law
property. Jedadiah Purdy is critical of the libertarian property
thinking of the late nineteenth century which saw property as static,
suggesting that property should be understood as "a set of rules
evolving in response to technological and social innovation, . . .86
Eric Freyfogle has written that "[i]n the end, environmental laws are
not so much an attack on property rights as a reformulation of
them., 87 If we understood the history of common law property rights,
claims Freyfogle, we would understand that such reformulation is
only a part of an ongoing process of evolution in service to social
goals.88 Carol Rose and Joe Sax both argue that property rights have
always been responsive to social and economic conditions.8 9 Of
course reliance on the "common law evolution rationale" has not been
limited to legal changes impacting on the environment. For example,
in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.90, a case in which the California Court
abandoned the "long standing and time honored" 9' common law rule
of contributory negligence in favor of a new comparative negligence
rule, the court explained that "the time for a revision of the means for
84 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 16, at 367. Blumm and Ritchie argue that this evolution
"illustrates how formalistic thought has benefited defenders of regulatory restrictions." This
opportunistic endorsement of formalism is a bit jarring in the context of the authors' grab bag
collection of evolving "rules" meant to serve as categorical defenses. The common law evolves,
but only, it seems, in service of the regulatory state.
85 Goldstein, supra note 62 at 349. Drawing a parallel with early 20'b century efforts to
regulate the economy in the interests of health and safety, Goldstein concludes that "[1]ike the
social changes that eviscerated the Lochner decision, the evolution of real property ownership in
America has brought the law of real property to the point where contemporary social ideals are
part of its very fabric." Id. at 409. Goldstein envisions evolving property rights rescuing failed
environmental regulation not just from whatever constraints the takings clause might impose,
but also any commerce clause limits that might follow United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Id. at 408.
86 Jedediab Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for
New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2005). While Purdy makes the same evolutionary
argument as those who advocate for environment-protecting innovations in property law, his
freedom-promoting agenda might often be in conflict since his concern is for human self-
realization which history demonstrates has almost always required some modification of the
natural environment.
87 Freyfogle, supra note 52, at 589.
88 Id. at 576. Freyfogle is highly critical of Richard Epstein's account of common law
history in TAKINGS, supra note 62. In support of his critique he cites Martin S. Flaherty, History
"Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995), and GREGORY
S. ALEXANDER, COMPETING VISIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997).
89 Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY:
THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49, 50 (Marian R. Chertow and Daniel C.
Esty, eds. 1997); Sax, supra note 15, at 1446-51.
90 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
91 Hilgedick v. Koehring Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 95 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing
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dealing with contributory fault in this state is long past due .... [I]t
lies within the province of this court to initiate the needed change by
our decision in this case. 92
From a purely theoretical perspective, the central problem with the
foregoing understanding of common law evolution is that it views the
common law process as a "supply side" enterprise. Douglas Whitman
has suggested that most writing on the evolution of the common law
is either "demand side" or "supply side." "Supply-side models . . .
explain the evolution of legal rules primarily in terms of the
preferences and behavior of the makers of law, judges." "[D]emand-
side models," on the other hand, "explain the evolution of legal rules
primarily in terms of the behavior of potential litigants, whose actions
are driven in part by the efficiency and other properties of the legal
rules that affect them. 9 3 The supply side model is a product of legal
realism, encouraged by 2 0 th century judicial activism and theories of
judicial pragmatism. But as I will demonstrate below, the demand
side models better reflect the history and experience of the common
law. 94 No doubt there has been some supply side law making,
particularly over the last century, 95 but almost always while laying
claim to the a restrained, supply side, explanation of the judicial role.
As Todd Zywicki has written, "[t]he common law judge's
responsibilities are different from the duties that legal realists assign
judges, namely to create the efficient or just policy. Instead, the judge
is little more than an expert trained in articulating the tacit beliefs and
expectations that undergird the ongoing order of the community. 96
92 532 P.2d at 1241.
93 Douglas G. Whitman, Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of
Compromise, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 753, 775-76 (2000).
9 Through the first half of the 20'h century it was widely accepted that the history of
American law could be understood by studying the writings of leading judges and other legal
thinkers. See, e.g., PERRY MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO
THE CIVIL WAR (1962). Willard Hurst rejected this approach and led a revolution with his
instrumentalist explanation of American legal history. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS(1950); HURST, supra note 20. This grass roots
explanation for legal development was not the instrumentalism of policy making judges, as
Professor Ruhl would have it, but of all those who encountered the legal system and whose
contributions could be understood only through painstaking investigation of local court records
and legal documents like wills, contracts leases, etc.. The classic demand side theory was
propounded in Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977)
and George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEG.
STUD. 65 (1977).
95 Todd Zywicki argues that the demand side approach of traditional common law has
been overtaken by a supply side approach of those who believe "the purpose of law is ... to
satisfy articulated social goals, whether economic, social, or moral." Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise
and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551,
1629 (2003).
96 Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law:
An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
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It cannot be disputed that the common law has evolved over its
long history. It would not have survived without adaptation to the
circumstances of time and place. But contrary to the simplistic
equation of change with evolution, the history of the common law
reflects gradual, purposeful and constrained development. It could be
no other way in a rule of law system. Not even the most ambitious
and committed advocate for ecosystem protection or any other cause
could agree that a common law court is free to make whatever
decision strikes its fancy, even if the court believes it is somehow
serving the public interest. Indeed the public has been well served by
a common law process that has provided stability for private ordering
in a world of changing values, knowledge and technology.
Accepting that common law courts are a legitimate source of law
in Anglo-American jurisprudence, that the law must be adaptable to
be functional over time and that courts cannot have unlimited
discretion without abandoning the rule of law, the challenge is and
always has been to define the scope and limits of judicial discretion.
Andrew Morriss, noting that the common law is not a "series of
unconstrained choices" by judges, argues that the common law courts
are constrained from making policy judgments by the specific facts of
their cases; by their limited geographic jurisdiction (which limits the
precedential impact of their decisions thus reducing incentives for
interest groups to seek influence); and by the law itself, the rule of
stare decisis and a strong bias against overruling prior decisions.97
But, of course, a strong bias is not a prohibition, and not every change
to existing case law takes the form of an overruling. What justifies the
overruling or a dramatic reinterpretation of a prior decision?
Recognizing that an expansion of the concept of nuisance requires
some justification, Professor Ruhl offers changed circumstances
including, most importantly, new knowledge about the economic
benefits provided by ecosystem services in support of his argument. 98
Certainly new knowledge must be accounted for, particularly in a fact
dependant doctrine like nuisance, but does the recognition of just any
newly understood harm constitute a nuisance? If so, how to explain
that some known harms have never constituted nuisance on the
principle of damnum absque injuria,- literally harm or damage
without injury, where injury means injustice or wrong in the sense
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 961, 991 (1996).
97 Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the American Codification
Debate, in Meiners & Morriss, supra note 2 at 130, 142-43.
98 Ruhl, supra note 7, at 761.
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that a legal remedy is due. 99 If not every harm constitutes legal injury,
than not every yet to be discovered harm necessarily constitutes legal
injury. How does a court know which is which? What changes to the
common law are necessary evolutionary adjustments and what are an
affront to the rule of law absent transitional adjustments of some
sort? 0
Oliver Wendell Holmes, an instrumentalist like Ruhl, explained
that the common law arose from "[t]he customs, beliefs, or needs of a
primitive time." The reason for the resulting rule is forgotten, but
"ingenious minds" conceive of "[s]ome ground of policy ... which
seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things;
and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons ... and enters on a
new career."'' 1 No doubt Professor Ruhl brings an ingenious mind to
the challenge of ecosystem preservation, but does the adaptation he
proposes conform to the traditions of the common law? The evolving
common law described by Holmes-new reasons for old rules
followed by new rules to better comport with new reasons, in the
words of Holmes' fellow instrumentalist Louis Brandeis, was "forged
in the slow fire of the centuries."'
10 2
Holmes illustrates the slow pace of this evolutionary process with
reference to the Greek and Roman origins of the English concept of
deodand which survived into the 19 th century, including in American
law. 10 3 This concept of responsibility in inanimate instruments of
harm evolved from a "personification of inanimate nature,"' °4
99 Without more, a simple declaration of damnum absque injuria in defense of the denial
of a legal remedy for harm suffered is no more persuasive that the assertion, without more, that
judicial reassignment of liabilities or property rights is merely the evolution of the common law.
The principle of harm without legal remedy is rooted in a recognition that social life could
barely proceed if individuals are held to account for their every impact on others. The success of
the common law of nuisance lay in recognizing, from custom and practice, what harms should
rest where they fall and what should be remedied. Over time the boundary might move in one
direction or the other. As Morton Horwitz observes, in early 191b century America the courts
increasingly "appealed to the idea of damnum absque injuria ... in direct proportion to their
recognition that conflicting and injurious uses of property were essential to economic
improvement." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
40 (1977). While Horwitz concludes that power, not principle, finally explains the evolution of
the common law in America, greater reliance by courts on the principle of damnum absque
injuria is better understood to reflect the sentiments and ambitions of a society of risk taking
entrepreneurs. See James L. Huffman, American Legal History According to Horwitz: The Rule
of Law Yields to Power, 37 TULSA L. REV. 953 (2002).
100 See discussion infra note 167.
101 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1881).
102 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 59, at 220.
103 HOLMES, supra note 101, at 7-34. Holmes quotes from an opinion by Justice Story
quoting from Justice Marshall in an admiralty case brought, said both renowned justices,
properly against a ship and not its owner. Id. at 29 (quoting from Harmony v. United States
(Malek Adhel), 43 U.S. 210, 234 (1844)).
"04Id. at 11.
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allowing vengeance to be levied by destruction of the instrument of
harm, to an understanding of human responsibility with delivery of
the harmful object as a form of compensation. The example is meant
to demonstrate that the form of the law remained relatively constant
while its purpose changed from vengeance to compensation, and that
the judge was instrumental to this change. But it did not happen over
night. It is a history extending over more than two millennia with the
unchanging purpose of doing justice for a particular type of harm,
while adjusting to new understandings of the source of harm and how
justice can be served.
Would recognition of ecosystem service loss as a nuisance be an
analogous evolutionary development to that recounted by Holmes?
Professor Ruhl would impose new liabilities on individuals whose
actions harmed beneficiaries of ecosystem services. Holmes describes
a history in which new liabilities were imposed on individuals
responsible for inanimate objects. But there are important differences.
In the case of harm from inanimate objects, the owner of the object
was always responsible in the sense that the object was taken and
destroyed. Indeed Holmes reports that as early as Roman law the
owner could retain the object by compensating for the harm.1" 5 Not
until very recently was it even suggested that the alteration of natural
landscapes might impose liabilities on those causing the alteration. In
fact, throughout American history the law has provided incentives for
alteration of the natural environment and has even viewed such
development as a natural use of the land. 10 6 Furthermore, the two
cases are different from the perspective of the alleged victims of
harm. There was never any doubt that a person injured by an
inanimate object suffered legal harm, although understanding of the
nature of the harm and the appropriate remedy changed over time.
Harm suffered due to loss of ecosystem services has always been
damnum absque injuria. Professor Ruhl would have the courts change
that, presumably overnight if possible.1
0 7
105 Id. at 9.
106 William Hale distinguishes between "natural and necessary development of land itself,
and injury resulting from the character of some business not incident and necessary to the
development of the land or other substances lying within it." Hale, supra note 40 at 425 quoting
from Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe-Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 375-76 (1893).
I07 Some have suggested an analogy between the evolution of the common law and
Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific change. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1970); see, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537, 540 n12 (1972). But, notwithstanding the long lingering influence of
Langdell and his law as science ideas, science and the common law are fundamentally different
enterprises. Because the pursuit of science is truth, truths are posited and, if adequate to answer
the questions being asked, they are relied upon by individual scientists who cannot determine
for themselves the answer to every question relevant to their particular, grass roots, work.
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Perhaps the example I have chosen from Holmes is not
representative of the evolutionary process he describes and embraces
in The Common Law. In his extensive discussion of the law of torts,
as elsewhere in his several lectures, Holmes continually emphasizes
that the common law is rooted in policy as well as precedent and,
therefore, "what the courts declare to have always been the law is in
fact new. . . . The very considerations that judges most rarely
mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which
the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations
of what is expedient for the community concerned."' 10 8 This seems to
describe a common law that would easily accommodate ecosystem
service harms, once the policy case has been made, but Holmes'
account of tort law reveals significant constraints on the policy
minded judge. "[Tort law's] concrete rules, as well as the general
questions addressed to the jury, show that the defendant must have
had at least a fair chance of avoiding the infliction of harm ... [and
must be], judged by average standards, . . . to blame for what he
does." 109 Of course modem tort law has paid little heed to these
constraints, but there are many who would argue today that therein
lies the failure of a tort system that, having abandoned precedent in
the name of policy, has created a lottery for plaintiffs and a cash
machine for their lawyers, all in the name of the public interest.
Rather than the judge playing the legitimate legislative role of gap
filling with reference to public needs, as contemplated by Holmes,
courts have converted a fault based system to a compensation based
system, leaving legislatures to struggle with the endless battles over
tort reform in the face of new found rights said to be deeply rooted in
the common law.
Another potential role model for those who would speed the pace
of common law evolution by abandoning its internal constraints is
Benjamin Cardozo, Holmes' philosophical fellow traveler and
successor on the Supreme Court. Many a law student has read in
Change comes in fits and starts with often revolutionary consequences for science on the ground
or in the lab. The common law judge is also concerned with truth, not in the law but it the facts
of particular cases. Although some advocates of environmental protection look to science to
trump the politics of law-making and others would have law reflect moral truths, the common
law does not depend upon top down truths that might change in revolutionary fashion. Rather
the common law is a method for determining the truth about what happened in a particular case
and the truth about what parties to the case might reasonably have expected the governing rules
to be. A central purpose of the common law is to protect settled expectations. A central purpose
of science is to upset settled expectation.
108 HOLMES, supra note 101, at 35.
109 Id. at 163.
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Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process "that the rule of
adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to
be in some degree relaxed." But it should not be relaxed, wrote
Cardozo, where the old rule "may ... reasonably be supposed to have
determined the conduct of the litigants, . . ."110 This concern for
settled expectations was reflected in the Connecticut case he cited to
illustrate his position.
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules
of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the
fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation
badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that
another rule of law represents what should be according to
the established and settled judgment of society, and no
considerable property rights have become vested in reliance
upon the old rule.111 (emphasis added).
Thus even for Cardozo, change in the common law follows, not
leads, the "established and settled judgement of society" and is
particularly respectful of vested property rights. It is for the
legislature and the executive, not the courts, to try their hand at
leading society, and for the legislature to take vested property rights
consistent with the requirements of both the common law and the
constitution.
Few American judges have been more articulate, and none more
prominent, than Holmes and Cardozo in insisting on the importance
of public policy to common law decision making. But as conceived
by both jurists, the role of policy in judicial decision making is very
different from the role of policy in legislating. The judge does not
campaign for office on the basis of policy preferences, nor welcome
lobbyists to his chambers or courtroom, nor conduct hearings or have
reference to polls to measure the mood of the community. The
judge's evidence of public needs and concerns derives from the same
process and sources as evidence about the facts of particular cases.
The common law judge hears testimony and reads memoranda from
private parties attesting to private expectations and private
circumstances. In no single case will the judge learn much of public
policy except perhaps the personnel opinions of the litigants or their
representatives. Only after the common law judge hears many cases
and studies the reported accounts of other cases does an
understanding of community needs and concerns begin to emerge. It
110 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150(1921).
111 Id. at 151 (quoting from Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99 (1915)).
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is an understanding that does not separate public interests from
private interests, rather the public interest of the common law process
is evidenced by the gradual accumulation of knowledge about private
interactions and the circumstances in which they occur-Justice
Brandeis's "slow fire of the centuries.'
'
"
12
This bottom up perspective on public policy is extremely valuable.
Indeed it leads to an understanding that cannot be achieved through
the top down processes of the legislature.' 13 And it is democratic, in
its own way, both through its open door to all seeking adjudication
and its reliance on the jury in finding the facts. But it is very different
from the legislative process. Just as the legislature is precluded from
adjudicating particular disputes for lack of institutional
competence, 1 4 so too have the common law courts been constrained
by the limitations of their process. To be sure, there have been judges
along the way who were not constrained. In most cases their
adventures are cut short on appeal, but occasionally, as in some 20th
century tort decisions alluded to above, they launch a revolution that
cannot be considered reasonably a part of the evolution of the
common law. When that happens we face what some scholars have
called transition problems, a topic to which I will return. 11
5
But first a dip of the toe into 19 th century common law history in
support of the foregoing description of the role of policy in the
evolution of the common law. Legal historian Morton Horwitz, with
his law as power perspective,' 16 would seem an unlikely source for
confirming the claim that 1 9th century common law courts were not
top down policy makers. So what picture does Horwitz paint?
Quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe on "[t]he legislative responsibility of
lawyers and judges" in late 18th century America, Horwitz concludes
that "by 1820 the process of common law decision making had taken
on many of the qualities of legislation."' 17 In support of this
conclusion Horwitz observes that "it would have been very unusual a
112 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102.
13 Jeffrey Rachlinski argues that, contrary to the widespread presumption that legislatures
are better able to deal with modem complexities, "common law courts have distilled massive
complexity down into simple, sometimes elegant rules. Rarely can that be said of any
legislature." Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REv.
933 (2006).
114 U.S. CONST. art. 1 prohibits the enactment of bills of attainder. "[T]he Bill of Attainder
Clause was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition,
but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function or more simply-trial by legislature." United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
1 5 See discussion infra at note 167.
16 See Huffman, supra note 99.
17 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 2.
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decade earlier to hear a lawyer argue ... that [compensation was not
due] for land taken for road building because it would 'thwart and
counteract the public in the exercise of this all-important authority for
the interest of the community.""' 8 Perhaps, but it would have been
more unusual for courts in any American jurisdiction, then or to the
present day, to agree with the lawyer's argument. Certainly the power
of eminent domain was understood to serve the community interest,
but in almost every jurisdiction compensation was required and
always has been." 9 Although eminent domain cases were not unusual,
controversies between individuals and government were not the meat
and potatoes of common law courts. Private disputes dominated
judicial dockets and in those cases appeals to public policy were
largely related to the community interest in laws of contract, property
and tort that encouraged and facilitated private initiative and
entrepreneurship. Michael Greve said it well in The Demise of
Environmentalism in American Law.
By common law, I do not mean the historical common law as
it existed at the time of Blackstone or at the end of the
nineteenth century. Rather, I have in mind the basic logic of a
legal system whose principal purpose lies in protecting
private orderings. Such a system guarantees robust individual
rights to exclude others (property); provides avenues for
voluntary exchange (contracts); and protects against
aggression by outsiders (torts). 120
Consistent with Greve's understanding of the common law, most
of the cases cited by Horwitz relate to commerce and economic
development, to what Willard Hurst called the "release of energy.''
As Horwitz's many examples illustrate, 22 the demand for a release of
11ld. (quoting from Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 45 (S.C.L. 1796)).
119 "[I]n taking private property for public uses; the limitation [that compensation must be
paid] is admitted by the soundest authorities, and is adopted by all temperate and civilized
governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice." Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. 162 (N.Y. 1816). In the absence of a state constitutional requirement of compensation
and the inapplicability of the United States Constitution to state matters, Chancellor Kent clearly
intended to say that compensation was required by the common law. This was the law of
England during the colonial period and was the law in every state with the possible exception of
South Carolina.
120 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW, 115
(1996).
121 HURST, supra note 20, at 3-32.
122 Just in his brief introduction Horwitz cites as examples of judicial interest in public
policy: the commercial character of the country, the commercial code, the circulation of
negotiable instruments, the commercial development of water power, the development of
insurance, the freedom of contract, the improvement of land, the free transfer of estates, and the
free alienation of land. Horwitz asserts that this "instrumental perspective on law did not simply
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energy was everywhere on the judicial docket and, to the extent the
common law functioned as a restraint, it was changed-not because
judges had a vision of the public good, but because individual
entrepreneurs made their private needs known to the courts. 123 These
were not test cases brought by special interests seeking judicial
intervention in the political process. They were the inevitable product
of day to day life which gave birth to and provided the life blood of
the common law. 124 Among Tocqueville's many astute observations
of early 1 9 th century America was that
[a]lmost all the farmers of the United States combine some
trade with agriculture; most of them make agriculture itself a
trade. It seldom happens that an American farmer settles for
good upon the land which he occupies; especially in the
districts of the Far West, he brings land into tillage in order to
sell it again, and not to farm it; he builds a farmhouse on the
speculation that, as the state of the country will soon be
changed by the increase of population, a good price may be
obtained for it. 1
25
In commenting on this passage, Willard Hurst writes that "[f]aw
thus ratified values early and deeply instilled in the behavior of the
people, . .. This represented Cardozo's "established and settled
judgement of society.' 27 No one, particularly not judges, decided that
it would be a good thing for the nation for farmers to become
emerge as a response to new economic forces in the nineteenth century. Rather, judges began to
use law in order to encourage social change even in areas where they had previously refrained
from doing so." Supra note 99, at 2-4. But the reality is that judges did not decide based on
abstract concepts of social good or external pressures for change, they decided based upon the
evidence of private initiative and entrepreneurship that filled their dockets. Indeed only the
presence in their courts of those very entrepreneurs gave them the opportunity to decide.
123 "The law responds to the demands of those subject to it. If the law becomes
dysfunctional, increased pressure is brought to bear to reestablish its usefulness because parties
will contract around the rule to dilute its negative effects." "When contacting around the old rule
becomes so prevalent that investing resources in changing the rule is less costly than the
mounting transaction costs of repeatedly contracting around the rule and enforcing those
contracts, then the rule will change to match what individuals have been doing. As a result,
changes in the law lag behind changes in the expectations, customs, and other institutions that
condition social interaction." Zywicki, supra note 96, at 994, 1003.
124 Common law litigants may have private interests beyond those at stake in a particular
case. If they anticipate future disputes of a similar nature they may have an incentive to
advocate for changes in the law that will serve their interests in future cases. See Rubin, supra
note 94.
125 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 166 (Henry Reeve & Phillips
Bradley, trans., Vintage 1945).
126 HURST, supra note 20, at 13.
1
27 CARDOZO, supra note 110.
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speculators and entrepreneurs. Rather they witnessed that farmers
were engaged in entrepreneurship and the law was adapted to help
make the achievement of their private goals possible. Horwitz is
surely correct that the common law experienced a fall and rise in legal
formalism over the course of the 19th century, but the bottom up logic
of the common law remained largely unchanged until well into the
2 0th century.
Greve's point above,128 is not only that the common law has
largely to do with private ordering, although that is an important
recognition for those who would have the common law evolve into an
opportunity for judges to make public policy. Greve also asserts that
the common law has a logic, a method that defines it as a social
institution. It is one thing to acknowledge and understand how the law
evolves within this social institution, but if judges are to have
authority to make law from the top down it is no longer the same
social institution. The common law will not have evolved, rather an
entirely new and unprecedented system of law-making will have been
invented.
In the context of nuisance law, the claim that changes are just part
of the evolution of the common law is made more plausible by the
Restatement, on which Professor Ruhl relies heavily. In their effort to
reduce historic nuisance law to a set of rules and comments, the
authors of the Restatement have left case references to the Reporter's
Notes. The sections on nuisance are thus filled with abstract
references to public and private rights, with reasonableness as the
standard for resolving conflicting claims of right. 129 Reasonableness is
to be determined with reference to five variables,' 30 but absent
reference to the cases buried in the Reporter's Notes and in thousands
of volumes of case reports, it comes down to "a problem of relative
values to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light of
all the circumstances of that case.'' If a judge relies heavily on the
Restatement and does not become immersed in the case law, he or she
will exercise judgment in the abstract rather than in the context of the
historic and current practices that evidence what is reasonable and
therefore constitute the common law of nuisance. Perhaps by design,
128 GREVE, supra note 120.
129 "For one intentional tort-nuisance, when it involves intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land-the single word 'unreasonable' is used to describe the
balancing process." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. e (1979).
130 "(a) The extent of harm involved; (b) the character of the harm involved; (c) the social
value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded; (d) the suitability of the
particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and (e) the burden on the
person harmed of avoiding the harm." Id. at § 827.
131 Id. at § 826 cmt. b.
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the Restatement thus leads judges away from the bottom up method
of the common law.
VI. COMMON LAW COURTS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
The reality is that a new system of law-making was invented with
the founding of the American federal republic, not by judges but by
the framers of the constitution and the state ratifying conventions. To
some extent the common law continued to function as it had, but at
the same time the previously existing common law court6 became
part of that new system. With the adoption of the Constitution, the
common law courts had jurisdiction over matters arising under federal
law and state legislation making it necessary to integrate the common
law with laws rooted in the police power and the enumerated powers
of Congress. And there were state and federal constitutional limits on
state governments of which the common law courts were an integral
part.
What is the effect on the common law courts of constitutional
limits on government power? Certainly those courts must comply
with the due process clauses of the 5th and 14 th Amendments. They
must comply with the equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment.
The 7 th Amendment expressly requires common law courts to
preserve the right of trial by jury, and the 8th Amendment forbids
those courts from imposing excessive bail or cruel and unusual
punishment. Warrants issued by the courts must comply with the
requirements of the 4th Amendment. So it seems that courts, including
those that can be said to survive from before the Constitution, are
subject to the constitutional limitations that apply to the legislature
and the executive, 32 But what about the takings clause of the 5
th
Amendment that applies to the state governments pursuant to the due
process clause of the 14 th Amendment? 133 Does the takings clause
impose any constraints on state common law courts?
Professor Ruhl is clearly of the view that common law courts are
exempt from the takings clause, at least so long as we describe their
law making as part of the evolution of the common law. That is also
the view of Blumm and Ritchie in their much more ambitious
catalogue of "categorical defenses" to takings claims. 34 But the
ambitions for takings exemptions do not stop with judicial law
132 "The Supreme Court has unhesitatingly extended most of the noneconomic restrictions
of the Constitution to judicial actions, even in the face of express constitutional language to the
contrary." Thompson, supra note 76, at 1456.
133 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
134 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 16.
[Vol. 58:3
BEWARE OF GREENS
making. They extend as well to legislative law making if it is done in
the name of a common law doctrine. By this view, the legislature, and
presumably any other government entity, can participate in the
"evolution" of the common law. Justice Scalia's background
principles language in Lucas thus becomes a free pass to destruction
of all economic value in private property so long as we remember to
call it a nuisance or some other name with common-law pedigree.'35
But why should common-law courts be privileged against takings
clause challenges? And why should the other two branches of
government be able to bootstrap off whatever privilege the courts
may be found to possess? The second question underscores that the
presumption of judicial privilege should be reconsidered. 136
In the wake of Lucas a few commentators questioned "why ...
restrictions on property use emanating from the common law should
enjoy a constitutionally privileged position in comparison with those
imposed on an on-going basis by legislation.' ' 137 But for the vast
majority of Lucas commentators, the possibility that judicial
redefinition of property law might constitute a judicial taking is not
even considered. As Barton Thompson observes in the most
comprehensive and thoughtful article on the subject, "[m]ost scholars
have assumed that no one could seriously make such an argument
[that the takings protections apply to the courts] and have sloughed
off the issue with a passing sentence or footnote." 138 It is true that
"[n]ormally, we conceive of takings by legislative action which
adopts eminent domain statutes or land use regulations which
substantially impinge on already established uses of property.,i39 It is
also true that case law on the question is by no means definitive and is
135 Surely this is form over substance, the very problem that justified early 19th century
courts in demonstrating the evolutionary capacities of the common law. Blumm and Ritchie,
make the case for such formalism, supra note 16, at 368.
136 John Humbach has written that "[t]he law of nuisance has been able to evolve, not just
through private initiatives of litigants in court, but also through the democracy-driven processes
of elected state legislatures." John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the
Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1993). Because most police power measures
could be said to regulate nuisances, this claim has the (intended) effect of immunizing most
legislative measures from the limits of the takings clause. But Carol Rose is surely correct that
"the mere invocation of 'public nuisance' is not an excuse for public appropriation of private
property." Rose, supra note 60, at 276.
137 Maurice J. Holland, Ill-Assorted Musings about Regulatory Takings and Constitutional
Law, 77 OR. L. REv. 949, 969 (1998). See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 504. "What is most
noteworthy about the Court's use of the common law in Lucas," says Kaplan, is that the court
privileged common-law restrictions over statutory ones and use the common law to avoid
articulating a novel constitutional standard."
138 Thompson, supra note 76, at 1453.
139 David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1434 (1996).
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often thought to favor the presumed judicial privilege if only because
opinions addressing the issue are few and far between. 1
40
Although, according to Thompson, "the most relevant Supreme
Court decisions suggest that courts are absolutely free to make ..
.[uncompensated] changes in property rights,"14' there is sufficient
case law to leave the question not clearly settled. The earliest
Supreme Court case addressing the question of judicial takings was
also the case that first established that the 5th Amendment takings
clause applies to the state pursuant to the 14th Amendment due
process clause. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicago the Court explicitly held that "a judgment of a state court,
even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken
for the state..., without compensation made or secured to the owner,
is ... wanting in the due process of law .. . Eight years later in
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad a plurality of the Court held
that judicial alteration without compensation of easements granted by
the state to plaintiffs infringed both the contract clause and the due
process clause. 143 Justice Holmes dissented on the ground that it
"never has been supposed ... that all property owners in a state have
a vested right that no general proposition of law shall be reversed,
changed, or modified by the courts if the consequence to them will be
more or less pecuniary loss." Two years later Holmes wrote for a
majority of the Court in a non-takings case that "[t]here is no
constitutional right to have all general propositions of law once
adopted remain unchanged." 144 Clearly Holmes did not anticipate the
gradual application to state governments of the bill of rights following
on the incorporation theory of Chicago, Burlington. Judicial changes
in the common law would come to be limited by several provisions of
the federal constitution, so if Holmes' view as applied to judicial
takings was to survive it would be necessary to explain how takings
cases are different from other state court invasions of federal
constitutional rights.
140 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 517 n. 10 (1986) (stating that where a court changes the common law "it is well accepted
that no right to compensation exists"), Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.
J. 36, 51-52 (1964). ("[1]n the law of real property, it seems never to have been suggested that a
compensable taking was involved when the courts first 'took away' an easement by necessity
from an unwilling grantor, although we today clearly treat an easement as a kind of interest
which can give rise to a taking problem.").
141 Thompson, supra note 76, at 1453.
142 166 U.S. at 241.
143 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905).
1'4 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907).
[Vol. 58:3
BEWARE OF GREENS
Some of the resistance to the idea of judicial takings, at least in the
context of federal constitutional limits on state courts, is rooted in
federalism. But this rationale, dating as far back as Barron v.
Baltimore,145 was deeply undercut by the enactment of the 14th
Amendment and has been further undercut by incorporation of most
of the bill of rights into due process. So the most common argument
relied upon by objectors to judicial takings is the general claim that
whatever state court decisions may appear to result in a taking are
merely incidences of the evolution of the common law. A handful of
Supreme Court cases leading up to the New Deal justified the
rejection of judicial takings claims on this basis, as had Holmes in his
dissent in Muhlker. Justice Brandeis wrote in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Hill that pursuant to their common law function,
"[s]tate courts . . . may ordinarily overrule their own decisions
without offending constitutional guaranties, even though parties may
have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier decisions.'' 146
In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Co. Justice Cardozo found
no federal constitutional limits where a state court is "defining the
limits of adherence to precedent...'' 4  Perhaps Justice Brandeis
hedged his position a bit with the qualifier "ordinarily," a
qualification suggested also in Broad River Power Co. v. State of
South Carolina ex rel. Daniel where the court assumed authority "to
inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or
substantial basis. 148
With Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo leading the way in
establishing a state court privilege against takings claims, it is fair to
ask whether I have gotten their positions on the evolution of the
common law correct. 149 It could be that their objection to judicial
takings was rooted largely in federalism concerns, but neither the
language of their opinions nor their more general views on
incorporation and the scope of federal power support that
interpretation. A more cynical perspective might be that while all
three justices understood that the rule of law requires a constrained
vision of common law evolution, they were more strongly committed
to instrumentalism and judicial pragmatism,' 50 particularly when the
14532 U.S. 243 (1833).
146281 U.S. 673, 682 n.8 (1930).
147 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). See also Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
148281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930).
149 See discussion supra accompanying notes 101-11.
150 Professor Thompson underscores the instrumentalist nature of the anti-judicial takings
position that has relied on the opinions of Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo.
Curiously, courts and scholars who have opposed applying the takings protections to
judicial changes in the law have not argued that judicial changes should be exempt because of
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instruments of power were in their hands and the rights affected are
what have come to be called "economic liberties."'' Viewed in this
way, their judicial takings opinions underscore the importance of
having the limits on power, including the takings clause, apply to
courts as well as the legislature and executive.
This more constrained understanding of state court powers and
common law evolution resurfaced in the concurring opinion of Justice
Stewart in Hughes v. Washington.152 The state court had held,
pursuant to a change in state law, that a particular property acquired
by federal grant could no longer acquire title to accreted land at the
shoreline. The landowner claimed a taking without compensation and
on appeal the Supreme Court held that federal law was controlling
and that under federal law title could still be acquired by accretion.1
5 3
Justice Stewart agreed with the outcome, but thought it necessary to
address the scope of state court power to alter existing property rights.
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive. But
to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law,
unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such
deference would be appropriate. For a State cannot be
permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple
any claimed efficacy in the judicial process. Nor have opponents argued that the rationales
motivating compensation apply differently to the courts than to the other branches of
government. Instead, opponents have urged that, whatever the arguments in favor of
compensating property holders, constraining judicial decisionmaking on property questions
could adversely impact other important interests. Thompson, supra note 76, at 1498.
151 Beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) and culminating in
Ferguson v. Skupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Supreme Court created a sharp distinction between
"fundamental" liberties and "economic" liberties, with threats to the latter receiving little or no
scrutiny by the Court. Although Justice Stewart objected in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972), that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is
a false one," the Court continues to give great deference to legislation impacting economic
liberties.
152 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967).
153 Federal law on title to accreted land was a reflection of the long established common
law rule. The substance of that rule, which the state of Washington sought to change by statute,
is in turn a reflection of the common law method. Gradual shifting of a stream marking property
boundaries results in a gain or loss to affected property owners, that is, the property boundary
moves with the stream. But an instantaneous shift in a stream (avulsion) does not result in the
gain or loss of property. Accretion, like the gradual evolution of the common law, can be fairly
anticipated. Avulsion upsets settled expectations.
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device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken
never existed at all.
154
With the exception of two dissenting opinions," 5 a case in which a
judicial taking claim was decided against the plaintiff but not because
of a judicial privilege, 156 and a case in which Justice Blackmun
asserted that "[n]either the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the
Florida courts by judicial decree" can convert interest earned from a
deposit with the court into "public money" without violating the
takings clause, 57 the Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of
judicial takings since Hughes. But as Paul Stephan observes,
"Stewart's equation of judicial with other governmental takings
continues out there, not quite accepted doctrine but never directly
repudiated by the Court. It describes a possibility, a space for
argument.",1
58
It is not apparent from Professor Ruhl's case for extending
nuisance law to ecosystem service protection that he sees any space
for argument about possible constitutional limits on the power of the
courts to amend the common law. Nor is he alone in seeing this as a
settled issue, indeed an issue that really requires no discussion. As he
observes in an earlier article, "[m]any commentators before me have
advanced the cause that the common law is profoundly adaptive.' 5 9
But ambitions for avoidance of the takings clause in pursuit of
environmental protection do not stop with this assumption of an
infinitely flexible common law. It extends to the immunization of
15 389 U.S. at 296-97.
155 In a dissenting opinion in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 334 n.l 1 (1987), Justice Stevens wrote: ".[T]he Constitution
measures a taking of property not by what a State says, or what it intends, but by what it does."
(quoting Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. at 443). The fact that
the effects of the regulation are stopped by judicial, as opposed to administrative decree, should
not affect the question whether compensation is required." In a dissent, joined by Justice
O'Connor, from denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994),
Justice Scalia cited Stewart's dissent in Hughes and stated that "[n]o more by judicial decree
than by legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public property without
compensation."
1561n Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Supreme Court held
that the California Supreme Court's changed interpretation of the California Constitution did not
result in a taking. If the judiciary is privileged against takings claims, the court could have
dismissed the property owners claim on that basis, but instead the court applied the Penn
Central balancing test as it would in a legislative or executive taking case. It might be argued
that state court interpretations of state constitutions are different than state court interpretations
of the common law, but it is not evident on what basis that distinction would be justified.
157 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
158 Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive Litigation-Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations,
and the Shadow of International Law, 88 VA. L. REv. 789, 829 (2002).
159J.B. Ruh], Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 1,
12(2005).
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legislative acts said to be based upon the common law. It creates not
just a hole you can drive a truck through. There is no longer any need
for a hole because whatever barrier the takings clause might have
imposed has been entirely eliminated.
If the Supreme Court had held in Hughes that the takings clause
requires compensation when a state court changes the law on title to
accreted coastal property, or had agreed to hear the Stevens case and
held that compensation is required where the state court declares on
the basis of custom that previously exclusive, private beaches are
henceforth open to the public, would the Court have "[frozen] the
State's common law," as Justice Stevens argued the court had done in
Lucas?160 If so, then either the common law of property must stop
evolving or the takings clause must be read out of the constitution.
But the choice is not so stark. The common law can continue to adapt
to changing circumstances in the context of a vibrant takings clause if
we understand and are true to both common law tradition and the
purpose of the takings clause.
CONCLUSION
I have argued above that the common law tradition is one of
gradual and "consumer" driven change. David Bederman has made
the same argument with respect to the common law doctrine of
custom.
[I]f American courts were to return the customary doctrine to
its original contours, most, if not all, of the constitutional
problems implicated in judicial takings claims would vanish.
Appellate courts ... would no longer be making sua sponte
assertions of public interests in private property. The courts
ideally would be reviewing jury verdicts endorsing proofs of
a localized custom. 161
To be sure, the boundary between traditional patterns of evolution
and unacceptable judicial law-making is not and cannot be clearly
delineated. But so it is with many perfectly functional legal lines in
the shifting sands of social existence. Volumes beyond counting have
been written about the challenges of legal interpretation with
differences of opinion over a wide spectrum, but so long as it is
agreed that interpretation occurs within a rule of law system, the role
of the judge is clear in this sense. The responsibilities of judgment
160 505 U.S. at 1068.
161 Bederman, supra note 139, at 1449.
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that gives judges their name relate to interpretation of the law, not
law-making. Inevitably law will be made in the process of
interpretation, but it is gap-filling, not path-breaking, law. Path-
breaking is for legislators who can be easily removed if those they
represent prefer the well trodden or a different path. The more
limited, but no less important, role of the judge is to resolve
disagreements about what the law is, not what it should be.
The rediscovery of the common law by Professor Ruhl and others
would be a grand thing if rooted in an understanding and appreciation
of the liberty and efficiency enhancing benefits of the common law.
In fact, Professor Ruhl does evidence that he understands and maybe
even appreciates these attributes of the common law, but the fact that
he admits to riding a Trojan horse should give pause to libertarians
and democrats alike. The rush to embrace the common law in the
wake of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas evidences not a scintilla of
confidence in the common law process. Rather it is blatant and
cynical opportunism that underscores the inadequacy of Supreme
Court takings law in general and, I suspect, a misunderstanding of
Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion in particular.
It has been widely argued that Scalia's background principles
concept has the effect of replacing the uncertainties inherent in the
Penn Central 62 balancing test with the even greater uncertainties
inherent in common law nuisance. 163 While it is certainly accurate to
describe Penn Central as a confirmation of uncertainties in takings
doctrine dating all the way back to Pennsylvania Coal,'64 it distorts
the content and process of the common law to attribute even greater
uncertainty to nuisance. But it does serve the objective of establishing
immunity from takings, for courts in particular, to believe that
nuisance law is whatever the judge decides it should be. What does
not allow for the playing of a nuisance trump in every takings case is
the traditional understanding that the common law is what people
generally expect it to be. Settled expectations are the heart and soul of
the common law, and the best evidence of those expectations,
including their evolution over time, is the day to day, year to year,
decade to decade docket of the common law court.
165
162 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
163 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 15, at 1419; Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause in
America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 281, 310 (1993).
164 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
165 "As individuals within a group confront similar conflicts over property rights, tradition
becomes a way of economizing on adjudication costs. Hence, the common law evolves by
categorizing similarities between different conflicts and using those similarities to create
property and liability rules." Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions
for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up of Top-Down? 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 73, 79
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Where settled expectations are a principle source of the law, it is
rare that settled expectations will be upset by changes in the law-
rather change is sometimes necessary to protect expectations. But as
we learned from, or were reminded by, the Legal Realists, 166 judges
are people too. What is to be done about the judge who wants to blaze
new paths rather than recognize and maintain the paths worn by those
who use them? The appellate process is one check on such judges, but
appellate judges are people too, even those in the House of Lords,
though little of a path breaking nature ever cleared that hurdle. And
there are sometimes constraints beyond the loyalty of most judges to
the institution they serve. For example, "the rule in English common
law was that a judicial order decreeing a custom was binding only in
that tribunal,"' 67 presumably to assure that what may or may not
reflect settled expectations in one locale would not too easily become
precedent in another community where settled expectations may be
different.
American courts were, for most of two centuries, English courts.
They brought with them the English common law and adapted its
substantive content to the circumstances of North America and the
needs of newly established communities. The method of the common
law and the relationship of the courts to the legislative and executive
functions of government remained largely unchanged. But the
founding of the American nation brought important changes to both
method and intra governmental relations. These changes were rooted
in the Constitution, and both tend to be ignored by those who look to
English common law as precedent for common law in America.
Parliamentary sovereignty was abandoned in favor of popular
sovereignty with the Constitution granting limited powers to the
national legislature and guaranteeing individual liberties to citizens.
The powers of state governments were presumed to be similarly
defined by the people through their state constitutions. From the
outset state governments were subject to a handful of limitations set
forth in the federal constitution, but would become subject to many
more limits with the adoption of the 14th Amendment. For purposes of
judicial enforcement of common law nuisance, central among these
1 4th Amendment limits is the due process clause and its application of
the 5 th Amendment takings clause to state governments.
(1999).
166 See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (William Edmundson & Martin Golding eds., 2005).
167Bederman, supra note 139, at 1448.
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And so we arrive back at the takings clause. Although, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court over the past century, it has seldom
been an obstacle to governments' regulatory ambitions, it remains a
beacon of hope for property owners and an ominous threat to
environmentalists. Both groups seem unable to get past the reality that
the provision is a part of the 5 th Amendment. Property rights
advocates hope against hope that it will one day be interpreted not to
prohibit government action (except where there is no public purpose)
but to require compensation when government action has negative
economic consequences for particular property owners.
Environmentalists fear that expanded protection of property rights
under the takings clause would have devastating consequences for the
environment because governments simply cannot afford to pay
compensation. But environmentalists understand that pleading
inability to pay has never justified uncompensated takings by eminent
domain and will not carry the day if regulatory takings are found to be
analogous. The best way to assure that regulation does not result in a
taking is to persuade the courts that there was no property right to be
taken. Hence the appeal of common law nuisance.
There is much to be said for greater reliance on the common law.
It will allow markets to function with positive results in terms of
productivity and the allocation of scarce resources. But markets only
work where those participating in the market can reasonably rely that
their rights and liabilities will not change suddenly or arbitrarily. This
does not mean that rights and liabilities cannot be changed abruptly,
but when they are, transitional measures should be taken. That is the
point of the takings clause. 68 It does not operate as a prohibition of
government action. Rather it operates, or was intended to operate, as a
fair and practical means for short term transitioning from one set of
rules to another. Professor Ruhl's proposal that courts and legislatures
recognize ecosystem loss as a nuisance, whether in the context of
public nuisance or private nuisance, would constitute a radical change
168 In urging wariness of legal transitions, Richard Epstein advises that "[w]herever
possible try to keep the legal framework constant, and allow the response to societal changes to
take place through private adjustments." Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A
Presumptive Vote for the Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (2003-04).
The takings clause is unique among constitutional rights guarantees in providing a mechanism
for government to proceed with a desired action that would otherwise harm reliance interests.
Because money cannot compensate for every loss associated with the taking of private property
it is not a perfect solution, but it does allow for the shifting of many of the costs of government
action from isolated individuals to the benefitting community. Most property rights advocates
have agreed with Epstein's case for protecting reliance interests, but others have argued that
legal change might be better accomplished if individuals have greater incentives to anticipate
change in the law. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1657, 1658 (1999) (arguing for "anticipation-oriented" transition rules).
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in existing property rights and liabilities, not just another adaptation
in the evolution of the common law. The common law has always
been a reflection of the settled expectations of those it serves. Over
time it has adapted as expectations accommodate changing
circumstances. Where public desire or necessity is perceived by those
in power to require radical change, fairness, justice and good policy
require transitional adjustments for those affected. To claim that such
radical change is another evolutionary step is to deny the very
foundation of the common law.
A homely and perhaps familiar analogy will illustrate how the
common law has worked in the past. Most college and university
campuses have grown one building at a time over many years. As
buildings are added, walkways between buildings are constructed or
just appear as people travel from one building to another. At some
point a campus planner is hired to give order to the existing campus
and to plan for future development. There are two basic approaches
the campus planner might take to existing and future walkways. One
method is to rely on principles of design rooted in geometry and
aesthetics. The other is to put the walkways where people actually
walk. The latter is the method of the common law. From on high,
campus walkways may look a disaster in terms of abstract notions of
design, but on the ground they will serve the needs of those who use
the campus, and they will adapt as new buildings are added and old
ones torn down.
Scott Dewey has written that "evolution in a common law system
is not supposed to happen in a Darwinian fashion, by accident; it is
supposed to occur through 'intelligent design,' with courts changing
the rules only after making reasoned decisions to do So. ' 169 But in the
common law, as in biology, we should be skeptical of "intelligent
design" explanations and justifications. Certainly we want judges of
intelligence, but not judges who are designers. If that more limited job
does not interest judges, they should resign and run for the legislature.
And those who would look to the common law to protect the
environment should recognize the importance of settled expectations
to effective markets while taking their proposals for radical change to
the legislature.
169 Scott Hamilton Dewey, The Case of the Missing Holding: The Misreading of Zafiro v.
United States, The Misreplication of Precedent, and the Misfiring of Judicial Process in Federal
Jurisprudence on the Doctrine of Mutually Exclusive Defenses, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 149, 256
(2006).
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